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relationship between war and English fiscal policy It then 
examines in detail the creation of the debt under Henry VIII, its 
development into a standard feature of state finance under Edward 
VI, and its liquidation under Mary. Information on England and 
English crown finance was drawn principally from published primary 
sources while information on the Antwerp market and on continental 
affairs in general was derived mainly from secondary sources. 
This thesis argues that the methods chosen to manage and 
retire the debt in the later part of the reign of Edward VI and in the 
reign of Queen Mary were important steps in tapping the increasing 
wealth of the City of London and the Merchant Adventurers for the 
support of the crown. These measures, together with the Marian 
reform of customs rates restored balance to the English fiscal 
system and allowed England to meet the crises of the last twenty 
years of the reign of Elizabeth I. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is intended to be a portion of a larger 
investigation of the relationship among war, diplomacy, and English 
crown finances in the sixteenth century. That investigation will 
test the hypothesis that war was the central, defining activity of 
kingship and, as such, shaped diplomacy, administration and finance. 
Under this hypothesis, the disastrous fiscal effects of Henry 
VIII's first two wars with France led to the disendowment of the 
Church. The conversion of Church resources to the use of the crown 
was less an attempt to create a situation in which the crown could 
live on its own resources than a short term policy to supply the 
means to renew the wars. This required either enormous revenues 
or enormous reserves. Under sixteenth century conditions enormous 
reserves were more practical. The new revenue courts of the 1530s 
were the means to create those reserves. They were kept separate 
from the Exchequer and the Duchy of Lancaster not because the 
existing revenue courts were inefficient but because the revenues 
which the new courts managed were seen as extraordinary and 
temporary. 
The failure of English ambitions under Henry VIII and the 
Protector Somerset, acting for the child king Edward VI, left the 
crown impoverished. Retrenchment and revenue enhancement under 
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the Duke of Northumberland, acting for Edward VI, Queen Mary, and 
Queen Elizabeth restored stability to crown finances but left them 
essentially the same in revenue sources as they had been at the 
accession of Henry VIII. At least in this critical aspect there was 
no "revolution" in Tudor government. 
The decision to concentrate on the foreign debt in the period 
1544-1557 was taken because I was unable to discover any 
published discussion of the debt spanning the entire period and 
because the topic is sufficiently limited so that a basic study could 
be made without extensive use of sources available only in England. 
I am grateful to Dr. Ann Weikel for making available to me her 
personal copies of those volumes of the Letters and Papers of Henry 
VIII not available at the Portland State Library, her copy of the 
Acts of the Privy Council, and her extensive and detailed notes on J. 
D. Alsop's thesis. It is unfortunate that many basic research 
materials are not available at the library. 
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CHAPfERI 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of a single aspect of English fiscal history 
between 1544 and 1557.1 That aspect is the crown's foreign debt, 
essentially all of which was borrowed and repaid in Antwerp. This 
study examines the nature of the credit markets, the reasons for 
borrowing, the uses to which the proceeds were put, the mechanics 
of borrowing and repaying, and the role of foreign debt in the total 
scheme of mid-Tudor2 fiscal history. 
Fiscal history is the study of government finance. It is closely 
related to both administrative history and economic history but 
remains distinct. Administrative history focuses on the structural 
and organizational aspects of government as they change over time. 
That is, it focuses on what government was authorized to do; who 
was authorized to do it; how they were authorized to do it; and how 
they were organized to do it. Economic history focuses on the 
sources and uses of wealth in the society as they change over time. 
1Mary's borrowings of 1558-1559 for her war with France belong 
analytically to the final phase of the debt ending in its liquidation in 1570. 
2Mid-Tudor is by its nature an imprecise term. R. Tittler and J. Loach, 
eds., The Mid-Tudor Polity c. 1540-156Q (Totowa N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1980), chose a period whose beginning is symbolized by the fall of Thomas Cromwell 
and whose end is marked by the the accession of Elizabeth. I have chosen to examine a 
slightly shorter time span, 1542-1557. 
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Fiscal history provides the link between administrative history and 
economic history. It is the study of how the wealth of society is 
tapped by government to serve its organizational needs. 
Fiscal history is of critical importance in understanding and 
evaluating the options actually available to governments. A 
government's ability to act administratively, diplomatically, and 
militarily is intimately related to its ability to raise money. The 
means by which funds are raised tells the observer a great deal 
about the relationship between the government and the governed. 
This is because the raising of funds is the area of administration in 
which the interests of the governed and of the government are most 
diametrically opposed. 
Mid-Tudor fiscal history is especially interesting because of 
the stresses imposed by the great inflation, commonly known as the 
"price revolution" of the sixteenth century, because of the stresses 
imposed by England's attempt to play the role of a great power 
between 1544 and 1553, and because of the determined efforts at 
fiscal reform made by English governments beginning in 1551 to 
meet the consequences of these stresses. 
Between 1544 and 1553, the government of England attempted 
to play the role of a great power. The ruinous policy of war with 
Scotland and France pursued by Henry VIII in his last years and 
continued by the Protector Somerset exhausted the reserves of coin, 
plate, and land created by Henry VIII and his chief minister Thomas 
Cromwell. The sustained efforts to raise money for these wars, and 
to service the debt they created, allows one to examine the full 
array of revenue devices available to the mid-Tudor administration. 
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The mid-Tudor government, despite protracted efforts to 
reform crown finances, did not establish a tax-based revenue 
system. The fact that the government did not establish a new theory 
of revenue which would have permitted taxation to meet ordinary 
expenditures left Elizabeth's government dependent upon the same 
dues, rents, customs and extraordinary parliamentary grants which 
had proved inadequate to her predecessors. 
The failure of the government to create new sources of 
revenue adequate to the needs of a centralized administration goes a 
long way toward explaining the survival in England of an essentially 
medieval mixed polity with a functioning parliament and with local 
administration in the hands of Justices of the Peace.3 
To put the foreign debt in a meaningful context, this study 
exammes the great inflation of the sixteenth century with attention 
to the effects of price changes on the adequacy of crown revenues. 
It reviews the nature and role of money and credit in the sixteenth 
century, the Antwerp credit market, and the connection between 
England and Antwerp. It provides an overview of mid-Tudor fiscal 
3There was a fairly great level of governmental reorganization in the Tudor 
period, the creation of the Privy Council c. 1536, the shireing of Wales, and the 
Council of the North being key Henrician innovations. The Edwardian and Marian 
governments expanded conciliar government through the extensive use of special 
commissions. Elizabeth increased central control through the use of appointed Lords 
Lieutenant. Parliaments which had been nearly annual affairs from the late 14th 
century to the accession of Henry VII in 1485 declined in frequency but retained a 
monopoly of the right to levy taxes. The governmental structure Elizabeth left to 
James I was recognizably the same structure inherited by Henry VII. That is, 
government continued to rest on cooperation between the central administration, 
which remained tiny, and local notables who served the crown in part to serve 
themselves. 
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policy, administration, revenues and expenses with its primary 
focus on war and war preparedness. 
This context permits a detailed examination of the foreign 
debt. As we shall see, a key aspect of the price revolution was the 
rise in wealth of the commercial sector relative to the agricultural 
sector. The traditional revenue system continued to rely on agrarian 
rents stereotyped taxes, and fixed customs duties which did not 
reflect this change. The fiscal expedients of Thomas Cromwell and 
Henry VIII did not reflect this change either. In managing the debt, 
however, the Privy Council, Thomas Gresham, the Duke of 
Northumberland and Queen Mary found means to tum the wealth of 
the merchants to the support of the state. 
In doing so they temporarily relieved the crown of its foreign 
obligations and set the pattern for the final elimination of the 
foreign debt under Elizabeth. This was a major achievement. 
Coupled with the new Marian Book of Rates the use of the merchant's 
wealth restored balance to the fiscal system and allowed England to 
meet the crises of the last twenty years of Elizabeth's reign. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
OF THE 
MID-TUDOR FISCAL SYSTEM 
INfRODUCTION 
J. D. Alsop said, "Since finance, quite properly, has always been 
accorded a central place in the controversy over the existence of a 
revolution in government during Henry VIII's reign, the topic 
possesses considerable general significance. "4 This statement 
succinctly delineates both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
modern historiography of the English fiscal system in the sixteenth 
century. Fiscal history is seen as central and therefore has received 
considerable attention, but it is not seen as being of independent 
interest. Rather it is seen as a critical example of a class of 
administrative changes which either do, or do not constitute a 
"revolution" in administrative history. Except for F. C. Dietz's 
limited efforts on the reign of Henry VIII, the mid-Tudor foreign 
debt remains essentially unstudied. 
4 J. D. Alsop, "The Structure of Early Tudor Finance, c. 1509-1558" in C. 
Coleman and D. Starkey, eds, Revolution Reassessed: Revisions in the History of 
Tudor Government and Administration, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 135. 
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SELECTED HISTORIANS 
Here follows a brief examination of the works of six 
influential twentieth century historians as they relate to the mid-
Tudor fiscal system and especially the foreign debt. 
A. F. PoHard 
A. F. Pollard dominated Tudor history from 1900 to the 1940s. 
He has been called the iast of the Whig historians. 
"T""'l1. • • • 
1 ms is rrue m so 
far as "Whig" imp ii es a focus on those events and deveiopments 
which can be seen as leading to the "modern" and discounting the 
importance of those events and developments which were 
"medieval". This led to an unfortunate focus in his very limited 
fiscal writings on parliament and direct taxation. Pollard's interest 
m the foreign debt was limited. In his view it was deplorable. 
Pollard was not sparing in moral judgements. He called the 
Edwardian profit on the debasement "fraudulent". He characterized 
ivlary's reign as "sterile". His magisterial History of England from 
the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth pictured mid-
Tudor fiscal history as a struggle between powerful and competing 
interests: the crown against parliament on taxes; the shires against 
the government on assessment.5 
Pollard's Hegelian view of creative strife leading to a new 
synthesis is not without merit but is extreme in deaiing with the 
Tudor political, administrative, and fiscal system. Between 1534 
5 A. F. Pollard, The Political History of England from the Accession of Edward 
VI to the death of Elizabeth, (London: 1919), pp. 186-187. 
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and 1560, this system survived three major and a number of minor 
shifts in official religion, a minority reign, a female reign without 
issue and with an unpopular king, a series of major wars, and at 
least three potentially major rebellions. This system passed on to 
Elizabeth, not only a functioning government but a substantially 
restored revenue. 
F. C. Dietz 
F. C. Dietz was Pollard's first critic from the perspective of 
fiscal history. He found Pollard's views "incorrect in detail and m 
essence" primarily because Pollard over stressed the importance of 
Parliament and Parliamentary taxation.6 Dietz's English Government 
Finance 1485-15587 remains the only comprehensive survey of mid-
Tudor fiscal history. This work, together with Dietz's articles on 
the finances of Edward VI and Mary, Elizabeth, and James I and 
Charles I, is unsurpassed for clarity and focus.8 Dietz was fully 
aware of the importance of institutional and procedural change. 
Professor Alsop credits Dietz with speaking in terms of radical 
6 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", Smith College Studies in 
History, iii (Northampton Mass.: 1918), p. 71. 
7 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485-1558. (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1921; reprint London: Frank Cass & co., 1964). 
8 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", Smith College Studies in 
History, iii (Northampton Mass: 1918); F.C. Dietz, "The Exchequer in Elizabeth's 
Reign", Smith College Studies in History, viii no 2, (Northampton Mass, 1923); F.C. 
Dietz , "The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer During the Reigns of James I and 
Charles I", Smith College Studies in History. xiii no 4, (Northampton Mass: 1928). 
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change.9 This is literally true but essentially incorrect. Dietz saw 
the role of the revenue system as follows: 
"In the final analysis governmental revenue systems are 
efforts to turn the chief forms of wealth of the country 
most efficiently to the support of the state, with due 
regard for the prevailing political idea or theory. Their 
nature varies with and corresponds, sometimes tardily, 
to the changing economic development and organization 
of the country."10 
This viewpoint leads logically to an evolutionary view of 
fiscal history in the Tudor period. The suppression of the 
monasteries was in this view a logical extension of Lancastrian 
precedents. Direct taxation remained a war measure only. 
Debasement of the coin and alienation of lands were "unsound 
financial expedients" to meet short term needs. The reforms of 
1552 through 1558, especially the consolidation of revenue courts 
into the exchequer (1554), were simple cost reduction efforts. 
Professor Dietz's greatest relevance to the debate on the 
supposed revolution in Tudor financial administrationll is that he 
placed the most significant reforms in the reign of Mary. It was 
9 J. D. Alsop, "The Structure of Early Tudor Finance, 1509-1558",in C. 
Coleman and D. Starkey, Revolution Reassessed. Revisions in the history of Tudor 
Government and Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 136. 
10 F. C. Dietz, 'Finances of Edward VI and Mary', p. 71. 
l lG. R. Elton made a Tudor revolution the center of historiographic interest but 
he may have derived the idea from Dietz. "On the organization of the English revenue 
system in the Middle Ages much has been written, but little attention has been paid so 
far to the revolutionary changes made in that organization under the Tudors." F. C. 
Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 61. 
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Mary who reversed the spendthrift ways of her father's and brother's 
administrations. It was Mary who carried through the consolidation 
of the revenue courts. It was Mary who brought the household 
expenses under control. It was Mary who made progress in reducing 
pens10ns and annuities. It was Mary who began to increase the yield 
on remaining crown lands. Most important, it was Mary who 
reformed the customs with a new Book of Rates which allowed the 
government, however tardily, to effectively tap the mercantile 
wealth of the state.12 Dietz's revolution is not a revolution but a 
restoration of sound management which retained the best elements 
of the administrative changes which had occurred evolutionarily in 
the preceding reigns. 
Dietz is the only major historian to have devoted any 
substantial effort to study the foreign debt. His work on the reign 
of Henry VIII is excellent and detailed on activity but almost 
completely lacking in analysis. The study of the debt between 1544 
and 1547 was facilitated by the availability of Letters and papers of 
Henry VIII. Dietz states: "Henry VIII's foreign loans during the last 
years of his reign are perhaps of more interest, than of preeminent 
importance. The activity of his agent in Flanders gives some 
glimpses into the practice of international banking and business m 
this earlier time." 13 This is undoubtedly true but it is only a part of 
the story. What was not of preeminent importance under Henry VIII 
was to grow to very pressing importance under Edward VI and Mary. 
12 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 202-14. 
13 Ibid., p. 167. 
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Professor Dietz failed to identify the great shift under 
Northumberland and Mary to relying on the Merchant Adventurers to 
guarantee, service, and repay the debt. In this he missed a key 
aspect of his own argument that the nature of government revenue 
systems vary with and correspond to the changing economic 
development and organization of the country. 
Unfortunately Dietz's interest in the debt declined as the 
sources became more difficult. He replaced analysis of the debt as a 
separate item with notices of individual transactions for which 
documentation survives and with summaries of the amounts 
outstanding. The question of debt became subsumed into the issues 
of exchange rates between the English and Flemish pound. The 
exchange rate was assumed to be related closely to the debasement 
of coinage. The debt therefore slowly sank off the page and into the 
footnotes. This is the pattern which has been adopted by most 
subsequent historians. 
Professor Dietz's work remains of great value. His use of 
sources and his methods of computation have been criticized by both 
Dr. Challis and Dr. Alsop. They each point out his excessive reliance 
on summary accounts and his excessive concentration on regnal 
periods. Never the less both conclude that his work, while in need of 
substantial revision, remains essentially sound.14 
14J. D. Alsop, "The Exchequer of Receipt in the Reign of Edward VI" 
(Cambridge, 1978) unpublished Ph.D. thesis, p. 283?. I am grateful to Dr. Ann Weikel 
for allowing me to use her extensive and detailed notes on Dr. Alsop's thesis.; C. E. 
Challis, "The Debasement of the Coinage, 1542-1551 ", Ec.H.R., 2nd ser., XXV (May 
1972), p.454. 
I I 
G.R. Elton 
G. R. Elton is the most influential of living Tudor historians. 
His discovery of a "revolution" in Tudor fiscal administration set the 
agenda for the debate on Tudor government for the last twenty five 
yearslS. This revolution began in the 1530s under the guidance of 
Thomas Cromwell who, building on the reforms of Edward IV, sought 
to make the crown independent of fiscal restraint by increasing the 
crown lands at the expense of the church. 
The establishment of new revenue courts which superseded the 
Exchequer as the centers of fiscal administration characterized 
Cromwell's revolution. Cromwell's goal was to combine the 
advantages of regular bureaucratic administration with the 
flexibility of Chamber administration and to do so while eliminating 
the monarch's personal control of administration. The creation of a 
new institution of government, the Privy Council, designed to 
contain only men of political eminence, was critical to this process. 
These men, whom Professor Elton describes as being of cabinet rank, 
were the chief officers of state.16 
There is much to be said for this position. The household 
system declined despite a brief recrudescence following Cromwell's 
death .. Government through and even by the Privy Council was the 
defining characteristic of mid and late Tudor government. If the 
15G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969). 
16G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation. England 1509-1558, (Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp 201-229; Elton, England Under the 
Tudors, (New York: Methuen, 1955), pp. 180-184. 
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role of Cromwell has been over-stressed it is at least hard to 
1magme the changes of the 1530s without his participation. Having 
said this, Professor Elton had very little to say about fiscal as 
opposed to administrative history and almost nothing to say about 
the debt. 
J. D. Alsop 
J. D. Alsop, one of Professor Elton's students, is a prolific 
producer of articles on fiscal administration in the mid-Tudor 
period. His doctoral thesis, "The Exchequer of Receipt in the Reign 
of Edward VI" (Cambridge, 1978) remains unpublished. Among his 
numerous articles the most important for this study is "The 
Structure of Early Tudor Finance" in Coleman and Starkey, eds, 
Revolution Reassessed. Revisions in the History of Tudor Government 
and Administration. This article includes a brief but highly 
informative review of the historiography of Tudor fiscal 
administration. He places the growing authority of the Privy Council 
through the 1540s and 1550s into the context of an administration 
in transition. While revenue courts were ephemeral, changes in 
accounting and auditing methods were not. This was in large 
measure due to the low level of turnover of persons within the 
administration, and the ease with which clerks as well as senior 
administrators moved between household agencies and central 
agencies of finance. The image which emerges from Dr. Alsop's work 
is of an evolving administrative structure, at once flexible, 
personalized, and orderly. As Dr. Alsop's interests are very much 
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administrative. He has little to say of the actual sources and uses 
of funds or of the role of the debt in mid-Tudor finance. 
W. K. Jordan 
W. K. Jordan is perhaps the best known historian of the reign of 
Edward VI. His massive two volume series, Edward VI, The Young 
King, and its successor Edward VI, The Threshold of Power provide a 
detailed overview of the religious, social, and political issues of the 
reign. They are weaker on economic history and very weak on fiscal 
history. 
Professor Jordan devoted one long paragraph to the external 
debt in the period 1547-1550. He provided a very competent 
overview of the debt from 1550 to 1553. He saw the reduction of 
the debt as the result of the brilliance of Thomas Gresham's 
management as the king's agent in Flanders and the effects of the 
restoration and calling down of the coin in 1552. 
D. M. Loades 
D. M. Loades is an historian of the reign of Queen Mary. His The 
Reign of Mary Tudor. Politics. Government. and Religion in England 
1553-1558, is a remarkable work. The quality of research 1s very 
high and the presentation very detailed. While Dr. Loades is 
primarily a political historian, he realizes the centrality of fiscal 
administration to politics and government. 
In three extraordinarily dense chapters he covers "Financial 
Policy, 1553-1554", "Financial Affairs, 1554-1557", and "War and 
Finance-1557-1558 ". In paragraphs which frequently reach 400 
1 4 
words in length he provides so much information in so little space 
that the reader is often compelled to read the same page several 
times. 
Dr. Loades stresses the theme of continuity which we have 
already seen in J. D. Alsop. Despite the abrupt religious reversal 
that attended Mary's accession several key financial experts 
continued to play their accustomed roles in the financial 
administration. These included the Marquis of Winchester, the Lord 
Treasurer since 1550; Sir John Baker, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
since 1545; Sir Edmund Peckham, Master of the Mint since 1546; Sir 
Walter Mildmay, an experienced auditor and frequent commissioner; 
and Thomas Gresham, king's agent in Antwerp since 1552. This 
element of continuity guaranteed that the reforming efforts of 
Northumberland would be continued through Mary's reign. The 
retention of Treasurer Winchester rather than a distaste for 
Cromwell's revenue courts sealed the fate of the Courts of 
Augmentations and First Fruits and Tenths. The continued 
successful management of the foreign debt was guaranteed by the 
retention of Gresham. 
Dr. Loades correctly identifies the key mid-Tudor problems of 
cash flow and war finance. His discussion of cash flow 1s 
particularly useful. Payments by the crown, especially to foreign 
bankers, had to be made promptly while collection of revenues 
lagged woefully. The crown was owed very substantial amounts of 
money and these tended to increase over time. Unfortunately the 
size of individual debts was small. Therefore collection of these 
funds required administrative action quite in excess of the value of 
1 5 
their collection and so revenues never could approach their nominal 
rates. 
War was a test of the fiscal system which it was not prepared 
to withstand. The very great needs of the state to reduce 
expenditures and enhance revenues occupied the fiscal 
administration to the exclusion of the issue of rebuilding reserves. 
Thus when war was forced on the Council in 1557 the only source of 
immediate funds was to renew borrowing at Antwerp. 
Dr. Loades discussion of the foreign debt is detailed 
chronologically and interesting technically. He sees the increase of 
the debt in 1553-1555 primarily as a political decision to pay 
creditors in England in preference to continuing Northumberland's 
policy of foreign debt reduction. In this he follows Dietz. He 
correctly identifies the importance of Thomas Gresham's use of the 
credit and revenue of Merchant Adventurers and Staplers to 
manipulate and fix the exchange. Unfortunately Dr. Loades seems 
poorly informed on the relationship between the crown debt and the 
Adventurers and Staplers in the reign of King Edward VI. This leads 
to misinterpretation of the nature, timing, and importance of 
innovations. D.. M. Loades has made a major contribution to the 
readily available information on mid-Tudor finance and especially 
the royal debt in the reign of Mary Tudor. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRICE REVOLUTION 
Mid-Tudor England, in common with its continental neighbors, 
was experiencing the effects of prolonged inflation. This period, the 
"price revolution", was marked by a steady rise in prices and a long 
term temporal decline in interest rates.17 In England the effects of 
the price revolution appear in a staggering 64 % increase in the cost 
of goods between 1510 and 1530.18 This increase became visible in 
government finance about 1538.19 Prices continued to nse 
throughout the sixteenth century. By 1550 they had increased 154 3 
on the 1510 base. By 1570 they had increased 190% and by 1590 
they had risen 284%. 
increased dramatically. 
War was among the activities whose cost 
The "price revolution", while increasing the need for funds, 
reduced the value of traditional sources of revenue including land 
17H. van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European 
Economy (fourteenth-sixteenth centuries), (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) vol II, 
pp. 199 ff. 
18E. H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, "Seven Centuries of the Price of 
Consumables, Compared with Builders Wage Rates", Economica, no. 92, Nov. 1956, 
n. s. vol xxiii. 
19 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485-1558. (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1921; reprint London: Frank Cass & co., 1964), p. 140 A part of the 
cause of this delayed impact may lie in purveyance, the forced purchase of goods at 
government established prices. 
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rents, customs duties, and, to a great extent, parliamentary 
taxation. It also had the effect of reducing the relative wealth of 
the traditional agrarian rentier sector in favor of merchants and 
townsmen.20 As the crown was the greatest landholder of all, the 
fiscal effects were dramatic. 
The problems of crown land revenues were made worse by the 
important function of land as a source of patronage. Between 1510-
1519 and 1550-1559 the rents for new takings on the Herbert 
estates in Wiltshire studied by Eric Kerridge tripled, those of the 
crown increased 42 % . The Phelps Brown - Hopkins Index for the 
same period rose by 160 % . The Herberts may have been 
extraordinarily successful in raising rents but, with the lag inherent 
in 20 year leases, it is unlikely that they increased their total rent 
receipts by much more than the 59% achieved by the Seymours.21 
The crown's actual rent receipts must have shown a similar lag. 
The creation of a foreign crown debt was one effect of the 
increase in prices. The emergence of the City of London, the 
Staplers and the Merchant Adventurers as guarantors of the 
government's overseas credit and the increased importance of 
customs revenues after 1557 are two aspects of the crown's fiscal 
response to changing economic reality. 
20E. Kerridge, "The Movement of Rent, 1540-1640", E.H.R, 2nd series, VI 
(1953), I. 
21 The effect is difficult to quantify. Kerridge argues against a decline in 
landowner incomes but his argument focuses on the increase in rents after 1560. It 
seems clear from his study that between 1510 and 1559 landlord real incomes, at 
least in Wiltshire, declined on a per acre basis. E. Kerridge, "The Movement of Rent", 
passim. 
1 8 
CONTEMPORARY1HEORIES 
Three main factors were identified as responsible for price 
increases by contemporary and near contemporary observers of the 
inflation in England. Above all they saw enclosure as a cause of 
reduced food supplies, increased unemployment and poverty. The 
next most important cause was debasement of currency which was 
believed to lead to domestic inflation. Finally there was human 
avarice. This was not really an independent variable but the driving 
moral force behind the preference for sheep over plowmen, brass 
coin over silver, and especially buying and selling over production. 
The outpouring of Commonwealth literature from the mid 
1540s to the mid 1550s demonstrated the importance of the 
perceived crisis and the perceived need for reform. The essential 
nature of commonwealth thought in the mid-Tudor period was that 
the commonwealth men put the interests of society before those of 
the individual and sought systematic causes for the "griefs" 
afflicting the nation and systematic solutions to them.22 
The centrality of "enclosure" to this literature was inevitable 
m a country where at least 90% of the population derived the bulk of 
its support from agriculture and in which competition for arable 
land was increasing due to demographic expansion. The conversion 
22 G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors, pp. 184-185. Elton notes a lack of 
serious studies of commonwealth thought. A.B. Clarke, "Thought Word and Deed in the 
Mid-Tudor Commonwealth; Sir Thomas Smith and Sir William Cecil in the Reign of 
Edward VI", (unpublished MA thesis, Portland State University, 1979), pp.70-92 
went some way toward remedying this defect. 
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of common lands and plow lands to sheep pasture and the conversion 
of open, that is strip, fields to contiguous blocks displaced farmers. 
Complicating the problem was the uncertainty of many farm tenures. 
Aggressive landlords could find means of terminating their tenants 
rights.23 
The role of enclosure remains debatable and debated. 
Professor Elton points out that there is little evidence of food 
shortage in Tudor England except in time of crop failure and that 
England remained, in normal times, an exporter of both grain and 
cloth. Enclosure was stimulated by the rising cloth market through 
the 1540s and into the 1550s and then declined in importance. The 
areas of land involved were small and the bulk of land was not 
enclosed for another two centuries.24 
Enclosure surely dispossessed some and caused economic 
dislocation for many but there is little clear ground for seeing a 
direct causal link between enclosure and inflation. Never-the-less 
it was an important issue in the mid-sixteenth century. The failure 
of repeated government attempts to stop the process, most notably 
the Protector Somerset's attempt to reverse it through a 
commission in 1548, demonstrate that enclosure made economic 
sense. Kett's Rebellion (July 1549) began as an enclosure riot and it 
23J. Youings, Sixteenth-Century England, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1984) passim, especially pp. 47-65. 
24G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors .. pp. 231-233. 
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1s normal to state that enclosure was Kett's main grievance. It was 
however only the first of twenty-nine enumerated grievances.25 
The second focus of Commonwealth literature's explanation of 
inflation, debasement of the coinage, was a more serious, though, 
less emotional, charge. In the sixteenth century coinage was one of 
a number of competing uses for precious metals. If the value of the 
metal in coins rose above the price at which metal could be 
purchased with coin there was a tendency to melt coin for bullion. 
The cost of a coin is always greater than the cost of its materials. 
This was especially true when coining was a labor intensive 
occupation of skilled craftsmen.26 The value of a coin, if it is not to 
be produced at a loss, must always exceed its cost. This difference, 
se1gnorage, was profit to the government. Under the "just price" 
theory prevalent in the middle ages this was perfectly reasonable.27 
Therefore, as specie prices crept up in the sixteenth century, 
the precious metal content of coins had to decline. This process was 
more advanced in France and Flanders than in England by the 1520s 
25 A. Fletcher, Tudor Rebellions, (London: Longman, 1968), pp. 68-71 argues 
that it was primarily a rent rebellion. He reproduces Kett's twenty nine articles 
pp .. 142-144. It seems dubious to me that the relative rarity of rural rebellion in the 
1540s and 1550s can be used as an argument for rural passivity. I infer from John 
Guy's discussion of the importance of local magnates to Tudor government that he 
believes that Kett's rebellion was the result of the attainder of the Duke of Norfolk 
which left a power vacuum in East Anglia. 
26 C. E. Challis, "The Debasement of the Coinage,1542-1551 ", Ec.H.R., 2nd 
ser. , XX, No. 3 ( 1967), p. 443. 
27 A. E. Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith (Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard U. Press, 1923) p 61-64 provides a good overview of 16th century 
monetary theory before Jean Bodin. G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors , pp. 224-
226. 
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and led to the overvaluation of English against continental corns. 
This was probably the cause for the devaluation of 1526 and may 
have been the primary cause of the devaluation of 1542.28 
Unfortunately for the future fineness of English coins this process 
was also profitable to the crown. 
Debasement began in earnest in 1544. From 1544 to 1551, that 
1s in the war years of Henry VIII and Somerset, debasement was 
carried out not as a means of adjusting the value of the metallic 
content of the coin to below face value but as a means of creating 
profits to finance the wars. The fineness of the silver coin was 
reduced from 11 oz. 2dwt. in 1526 to 3 oz. in April 1551.29 In 
October 1551 the fineness of new coin was restored to the 
approximate standard of 1526. 
The full course of the debasement of silver coin is shown in 
Tables I and II.30 Table I shows the fineness of the mix from which 
silver coins were made, the total face value of the mix of coins 
struck, the seignorage or government profit, and the amount of coin 
returned to the seller. Table II shows the same information in terms 
of fine silver.31 Table III outlines the course of the debasement of 
28 G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation: England 1509-1558 (London: Edward 
Arnold Pubs. Ltd., 1977), pp. 312-313. 
29 All weights are Troy weights. That is there are 12 ounces to the pound and 
20 penny weight to the ounce. 
30J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement: currency and the Economy in Mid-Tudor 
England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 11. All tables are slightly simplified 
and amplified. 
31 J. D.Gould, The Great Debasement p.12. 
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the gold coin. It is noteworthy that at no point was gold debased to 
the same extent as silver. We will return to this point in discussing 
the exchange rate between London and Antwerp. 
TABLE I 
THE SILVER COINAGE, 1526-1551 
Starting Fineness Total Seignorage 
date of coin/ lb Minted/ lb Seignorage To Merchant as 3 of Total 
oz. 
1526 1 1 
May 1542 10 
Apr 1544 9 
Apr 1545 6 
Apr 1546 4 
Apr 1547 4 
Apr 1549 6 
July 1550 6 
Apr 1551 3 
Oct 1551 11 
Starting 
1526 
May 1542 
Apr 1544 
Apr 1545 
Apr 1546 
Apr 1547 
Apr 1549 
July 1550 
Apr 1551 
Oct 1551 
dwt £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. 
2 2 5 0 1 0 2 4 
0 2 8 0 8 0 2 0 
0 2 8 0 8 8.5 1 19 
0 2 8 0 1 0 0 1 8 
0 2 8 0 1 9 4 18 
0 2 8 0 1 6 8 1 1 
0 3 12 0 1 18 0 1 14 
0 3 1 2 0 1 12 0 2 0 
0 3 12 0 2 2 0 1 10 
1 3 0 0 1 0 2 19 
TABLE II 
THE SILVER COINAGE, 1526-1551 
(FINE SIL VER) 
Total Minted/ Seignorage/ 
lb fine silver lb fine silver 
£ s. d. £ s. d. 
2 8 8 1 1 
2 17 7 9 7 
3 4 0 1 1 7 
4 16 0 2 0 0 
7 4 0 4 8 0 
7 4 0 4 0 0 
7 4 0 3 16 0 
7 4 0 3 4 0 
14 8 0 8 8 0 
3 5 2 1 1 
0 
0 
3.5 
0 
8 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.2 
16. 7 
17 .8 
41. 7 
60.9 
55.2 
52.8 
44.4 
61.1 
1. 7 
To Merchant/ 
lb fine silver 
£ s. d. 
2 7 7 
2 8 0 
2 12 5 
2 16 0 
2 16 0 
3 4 0 
3 8 0 
4 0 0 
6 0 0 
3 4 1 
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TABLE III 
THE GOLD COINAGE, 1526-1551 
Starting Total Minted/ Seignorage/ To Merchant/ 
lb fine gold lb fine gold lb fine gold 
£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. 
1526 27 16 5 2 10 27 13 7 
May 1542 30 1 0 1 5 0 28 16 0 
Apr 1544 30 1 0 1 5 0 28 16 0 
Apr 1545 32 14 6.5 2 14 6.5 30 0 0 
Apr 1546 36 0 0 5 8 0 30 12 0 
Apr 1547 36 0 0 1 4 0 34 16 0 
Jan 1549 37 1 10 1 1 1 0 36 0 0 
Dec 1550 29 13 6 1 14 0 27 19 6 
Oct 1551 36 3 9 2 9 36 1 0 
That debasement was profitable is clear. As the level of 
fineness declined the amount of coin mix which could be made for 
the same amount of fine silver increased. Table I shows the profit 
to the government through seignorage as an absolute profit and as a 
percentage of the mix minted. Why it was regarded by 
contemporaries, and continues to be regarded today as inflationary 
is less clear. While some £4,300,000 of coin was minted between 
1544 and 1551 most of it was in fact reminted from existing com. 
Gould estimates the supply of coin at fiat as follows:32 
32J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement pp. 81-82; P. Ramsey, Tudor Economic 
Problems. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1966), p. 118. 
Date 
1542 
April 
Early 
Early 
7 Jul 
18 Aug 
1546 
1549 
1551 
1551 
1551 
TABLE IV 
THE SUPPLY OF COIN, 1542-1551 
Supply of Coin 
£847,576 
£1,187,816 
£1,754,867 
£2,021,460 
£2, 170,650 
£1,187,850 
% Change 
from 1542 
+40.0% 
+107.0% 
+138.5% 
+156.1% 
+40.1 % 
24 
Quantity theory suggests that the dramatic increase in the 
supply of coin should have been accompanied by an equally dramatic 
rise in the general price level. This view was explicit in the views 
of the anonymous author of Policies to Reduce this Realme of 
England unto a Prosperous Wealthe and Estate (1549)33, and of Sir 
Thomas Smith, author of the Discourse of the Commonwealth of 
England.34 Ann Clarke has shown that Smith's opinions were the 
basis of William Cecil's policies under Elizabeth. That is, she has 
shown that the view that the debasement was the cause of inflation 
led to the Edwardian calling down of the coin in 1551 and had 
33R. H. Tawney and E. Power, Tudor Economic Documents, (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co.,1924, 1951), pp. 315-318. 
34M. Dewar, "The Authorship of the 'Discourse of the Commonweal."' Ec.H.R., 
2nd ser., XIX (1966), pp. 388-400. Dewar has argued that this work is by Smith. 
Her argument seems to be generally accepted at this time though elements of her 
evidence are questioned by W. K. Jordan and more recently J. D. Gould. It is still 
possible, though unlikely, that the Discourse is by Thomas Gresham or by some other 
person. 
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become dogma by 1560 when it led to the great Elizabethan calling 
down of the coin. 35 
Unfortunately, while price increases during the great 
debasement were dramatic they were of a lesser magnitude than the 
increase in coin and they did not reverse their direction after the 
call downs of 1551 and 1560. Price increases continued despite the 
reduction in the fiat value of the coin supply and despite the 
increased ratio of specie value to fiat value.36 This was contrary to 
the expectation of the Commonwealth writers, to the expectations 
of the government acting on their advice, and to the argument of 
those who maintain that the debasement of the coinage was the 
maJor cause of inflation in England.37 
The argument that high prices were due to avance was 
traditional. Just price theory held that the price of an item should 
be the cost of its materials, the cost of the labor required to 
produce it, and an allowance for the overheads of shop and family. 
Prices might fluctuate in times of shortage but were expected to 
remam on average stable. As long as wages were set by tradition, 
statute, or guild regulation and materials were primarily of local 
production this model was at least rational. 
35 A. B. Clarke, "Thought, Word and Deed in the Mid-Tudor Commonwealth: Sir 
Thomas Smith and Sir William Cecil in the Reign of Edward IV"... passim. 
36Any claim that the price decline of 1558 was due to the restoration of the 
coin should be treated with caution. 1557 was a year of severe crop failure not only 
in England but also in Flanders and so the index for that year is abnormally high. 
37 The Phelps Brown - Hopkins Price Index is reproduced in the Appendix. 
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As prices moved remorselessly higher in the sixteenth century 
it was reasonable for defenders of the idealized old order to blame 
price increases on the avarice of engrossers who bought on 
speculation, regrators who bought and sold without producing, 
landlords who sought to increase their wealth above the fair yield of 
their rents, and craftsmen who increased their prices. This moral 
thread dominated Commonwealth thought into the 1540s but then 
declined in importance. However it remained, especially in the 
sermons of Latimer, Lever, and others a primary justification for 
attacks on enclosers, engrossers, and debasers.38 
MODERN 1HEORIF.S 
Two major modern views have been put forward for the 
increase in prices. The first is non-technical. It maintains that 
demographic expansion underlies the price revolution.39 The second 
is technical and views an expansion of the money supply as the 
primary cause for the price revolution. 
The demographic argument is that the population of Europe, in 
the late 15th century, recovered from the effects of the black death. 
This generated real pressure on resources. Marginal land was put 
back into production but yielded less for the same labor and capital 
38G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation; England. 1509-1558 (Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 321. 
39see for example J. Guy, "The Tudor Age, 1485-1603", in K.0. Morgan gen 
ed .. The Oxford History of Britain, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp 257-
265. 
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inputs and so average productivity did not keep pace with growing 
population. This resulted in real scarcity and rising prices 
punctuated by famines. 
The demographic expansion is unquestionably true, although its 
full extent and timing may never be known. It is generally accepted 
that in 1348, the year of the first onset of the Black Death, the 
population of England exceeded four million and was less than five 
million. By 1525 it stood at approximately two and a quarter 
million. Thereafter population grew at an alarming rate. By 1551 it 
had reached three million and by 1600 it had surpassed four 
million.40 
The demographic expansion theory certainly isolates the most 
important single feature of the Tudor period from the point of view 
of social history. It has the added appeal of placing our most 
pressing current concern at the center of an historical problem. 
Population increase put pressures on resources with which we are 
familiar. Whether it was the main impetus for price increase is 
uncertain. It certainly increased potential market size and total 
consumption. It must have acted as a stimulant to trade, industry 
and migration from the land to cities. It must have intensified the 
competition between arable farming and pasturage and increased the 
importance, at least in people's minds, of enclosure. 
Having said this, demographic expansion alone seems a weak 
basis for sustained inflation. A case could perhaps be made for 
40E. A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-
18 71. (London: 1981). 
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deflation as a likely outcome of population increase. Had the supply 
of money remained constant while the number of consumers 
increased then the amount of money available to each would have 
declined. Given that their volume of transactions remained constant 
the purchasing power of money would have had to increase. This did 
not happen. The purchasing power of money decreased. The money 
supply was expanding not only in the narrow sense of coin but also in 
the broader sense of coin plus negotiable instruments.41 
It is possible that the volume of money transactions per capita 
declined and that the average English person took less part in the 
money economy in the sixteenth century than in the 15th. This 
seems unlikely, but the Phelps Brown - Hopkins Index shows a 42 3 
decline in the real wages of building craftsmen between 1510 and 
1570. This decline was the result of prices increasing faster than 
wages. Such a decline is not possible in societies where people 
depend on money income for subsistence. In sixteenth century 
England it was possible because most workers had other, 
agricultural, sources of subsistence. 
The second modern explanation of the price revolution is 
technical. It maintains that the rise of prices was due to an 
increase in the money supply greater than the increase in goods. The 
source of this increase in supply was Spanish America. With the 
increase in the volume of gold and silver in circulation more money 
41 For changes in the coin supply and a very competent commentary on the 
relationship of the coin supply to price levels see J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement: 
Currency and the Economy in Mid-Tudor England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 
pp. 71-86. 
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was chasing the same quantity of goods and prices were bid up. This 
quantity theory was an aspect of Jean Bodin's writings in the late 
1560s and 1570s in France. Its current advocates include Professor 
Elton. 
Money is a complex subject. Fortunately the sixteenth century 
had not yet experienced the growth in complexity of monetary 
components which we have witnessed in the 20th century. Therefore 
a relatively simple description of money is possible. In the 
sixteenth century, as today, money was a medium of exchange and a 
means of storing value. Like today, money had a fiat value 
established by the state. Finally money had and has a market value 
determined by supply and demand. 
All commercial transactions are in their essential nature 
barter. That is one good or service is exchanged for another. Pure 
barter requires that each party to an exchange have items to 
exchange that the other party wants and which can be exchanged at 
equal value. This is often difficult to achieve for several reasons. 
Only one party may want what the other party has to offer. It may 
be impossible to establish an exchange of equal value. There may be 
differences on the timing of the exchange and so forth. 
Money was and is a medium of exchange which serves to 
facilitate barter. It allows a party to acquire the goods he wants 
even when the other party does not want his goods. By replacing the 
unwanted goods with money the purchaser allows the seller to 
complete the transaction by purchasing goods which he wants at a 
later time from a different seller. This increases the efficiency of 
markets. Money as a medium of exchange can be any generally 
accepted form of token. 
effectively as gold coin.42 
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Cowrie shells or glass beads work as 
Money was and is a means of storing value. Money can be 
accumulated for future use or hoarded as a source of security. 
Inflation tends to dramatically reduce the utility of these uses of 
money. Money held as coin declines in value. One of the 
consequences of the prolonged inflation of the sixteenth century in 
England and on the continent was a preference for real assets as a 
means of storing value. Land, jewelry, and precious metals served 
better to retain value than did money. This had an enormous impact 
on spending patterns of the monied classes and put additional strain 
on supply. An alternative to real asset investment was to lend 
money at interest. 43 
Money issued by governments had and has a fiat value. That is, 
it has a value assigned by the issuing government, at which that 
government will accept it in payment of obligations, and at which it 
obliges others to accept it. This value is the domestic value of the 
currency for paying obligations denominated in that currency. 44 
42R. G. Lipsey and P. 0. Steiner, Economics, third edition, (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1972), pp. 589-592. 
43Jbid., pp. 590-591; J. S. Duesenberry, Money and Credit: Impact and 
Control (Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972), pp 10-11. 
44See, for instance, Henry VIII's proclamation of 1 October, 1524 "The King 
our sovereign lord, Henry VIII, by the grace of God King of England and of France, 
defender of the faith, and lord of Ireland, remembering that at the Parliament holden 
in London the 15th day of April in the 15th year of his reign, it was enacted, ordained 
and provided by the authority of the same that all manner of coins should go and be 
current throughout this his realm unto the Feast of St. Michael the Archangel last 
past, at such value and prices as in an act thereupon made more plainly appeareth: 
straightly chargeth, willeth, and commandeth that no manner of person or persons of 
what estate, degree, or condition he or they be of, within this realm, from henceforth 
3 1 
There are two important aspects to the fiat value of money under 
sixteenth century conditions. First, price structures were relatively 
rigid. For instance, most lands were leased for long terms at fixed 
rates. As land was the largest source of crown revenues any decline 
in the purchasing power of money was immediately translated into a 
decline in the crown's purchasing power because leases were 
monetized at fiat value. Second, the value of coin was only 
arbitrarily linked to the value of money. That is, the teston was not 
a shilling, it was a counter with an arbitrary value in units of 
account such as pounds, shillings, marks or crowns. Coin could be 
changed in value by the government thereby changing the value of 
cash on hand in an arbitrary manner.45 
Money was and is a commodity and as such trades at a value 
determined by its supply relative to demand for it. This is true both 
domestically and internationally although the two values need not be 
closely related. In extreme cases, (e.g. the Russian Ruble in the 
spring of 1992), a currency which is declining toward valueless in 
international trade may be appreciating in value domestically. The 
government's ability to set fiat values, to regulate prices, and to tax 
or otherwise regulate transactions can, in the short term counter 
do refuse to take and receive in payment all such coins at such values and prices as 
they be expressed in the said act, upon pain of imprisonment, and further to be 
punished at his pleasure. P. L. Hughs and J. F. Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) Vol I, p. 144. 
45 Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations. vol I, pp. 136, 141, 145, 
146, 156, 158, 261, 264, 327, 449, 529; Vol II, p. 150. 
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market influence on the domestic value of money, but, in the longer 
term money trades as a commodity.46 
The international value of a currency relative to other 
currencies is established by the relative supply of those currencies 
available on the market, and the demand for those currencies on the 
same market. It was also affected by the specie value of the coin. 
The value of the metal actually recoverable from the coin when 
melted set a floor value for coinage. 
In the sixteenth century the most important money market for 
the pound sterling was Antwerp. The value of the pound relative to 
other currencies in international trade was set by transactions on 
the Antwerp bourse. These transactions balanced the supply of 
negotiable instruments and coin denominated in pounds against the 
demand for pounds.47 
Sixteenth century observers, and many modern commentators, 
confused money with coin and the value of coin with its specie 
content. The idea was that coin is money and has value because of 
its precious metal content, not because a government says it 1s 
money. The mid-Tudor policy of meeting fiscal emergencies by 
reducing the specie content of the coin , 11 debasing the coin 11 , was 
blamed by William Cecil, Thomas Smith, Thomas Gresham, and most 
others for a host of economic ills. Their case is not proven. None-
46 Early commodity theories of money held that money was specie and so 
traded at its specie value. see Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith, 
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1923) pp. 25ff; Gould, The Great 
Debasement. passim. 
47The Antwerp Bourse is discussed below. 
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the-less it was and is widely believed.48 There are two aspects to 
the specie content argument. 
First, in international exchange the specie content of com was 
important. It established a floor value for the currency. If all else 
failed one could always melt coins. It also provided a convenient, 
but inaccurate, means of comparing the values of different forms of 
money. It did not set the value of money. As early as 1568 Jean 
Bodin had realized that the change in the specie content of coin was 
an unreliable predictor of the change in their value in domestic or 
international exchange. Inflation was outstripping debasement.49 
We will see Thomas Gresham successfully restore the value of the 
pound through restricting supply of bills of exchange without ra1smg 
the specie content of coin. 
Second, in domestic exchange, debasement of coinage created 
uncertainty as to value. Repeated debasement created a premium for 
old coin as it could be sold to the mint at a premium. That is, the 
government had covertly increased the fiat value, the value at which 
it will accept coin, of a portion of the currency without changing its 
face value. An old standard coin tendered at the mint could have a 
value in excess of its value in paying rent. Coin became less a 
medium of exchange and more a focus of speculation. "Better" coin 
was increasingly withheld from circulation until delivered to the 
48 G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors. pp. 225-228. 
49 A.E. Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith, pp. 56-57 Bodin found 
five reasons for the decline in the value of money. These were: 1) the greater 
abundance of specie, 2) monopolies, 3) scarcity of commodities, 4) indulgence of kings 
and lords, and 5) debasement. 
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mint at a profit. Each new issue of coin caused older, "better", 
issues to be withdrawn from circulation.so 
It has been widely claimed that the price revolution was the 
result of the influx of bullion from the Spanish possessions in the 
New Worlds1. Unfortunately the bulk of that influx came after large 
scale deliveries began to Spain from the mines at Potosi (c.1544). 
That was too late to explain the beginnings of the price rise. It is 
possible to deal with this problem by citing the increase in output 
from the German silver mines starting around 145052 and the 
proceeds of Portugese and Spanish conquests in Africa Asia, and 
America beginning at the very end of the 15th century .53 This 
increase allowed an increase in the volume of coin without 
immediately stimulating a commensurate rise in the production of 
goods. The flow of silver and gold through Spain then sustained the 
nse for decades. There are two problems with this view. 
First, it overstates the part played in the money supply by 
coin. The bulk of the money by the mid sixteenth century, did not 
50Gould, The Great Debasement, pp.7-33, provides an excellent , though 
technical, discussion of the determinants of mint supply and the prices at which coin 
would be tendered at the mint for reminting. 
51A.E. Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith. p.56 As early as 1548 
Bodin de Saint-Laurent remarked "du temps de Lupolde, ce qui coutait cent sols vaut 
ce jour dix livres, ce qui est a cause des pays nouvellement trouves et des minieres 
d'or et d'argent que les Espagnols et Portugais en apportent." 
52see J. U. Nef, "Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618", Journal of 
Political Economy. XLIX ( 1941 ), pp 575-591. 
53G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors. p 226; F.C. Dietz, An Economic 
History of England (New York: Holt and Co, 1942), pp.104-106. 
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exist as coin but as credit, that is as bills of exchange and 
accounting entries. It was created by the posting of entries in 
ledgers which reflect the issuance of various forms of promissory 
documents. The most striking aspect of the commercial expansion 
of the late 15th and early sixteenth century was the increasing 
importance of the assignment of debts between two parties to a 
third party. 
The late medieval trading system rested on periodic fairs. The 
purpose of fairs was to bring to gather as large a number of 
merchants and as extensive a range of commodities as possible m 
order to facilitate barter and minimize the intermediation of scarce 
com. Therefore fairs featured the temporary suspension of 
restrictions on foreign merchants and increasingly sophisticated 
cash clearing arrangements. Fairs might be annual, semi-annual, or 
quarterly but in all cases they were periodic gatherings to exchange 
goods and to settle accounts.54 
While final payment in coin was the theoretical basis of the 
system, the account settling function was critical. Merchants 
purchasing power was greatly enhanced and trade facilitated by 
being able to purchase goods on credit for later payment. Each 
credit transaction created money to the extent that the merchant 
could purchase goods as though he possessed coin. This money had 
only a limited effect as long as it remained a simple payable, 
54R. Ehrenberg, Capital & Finance in the Age of the Renaissance. (New York: 
Augustus Kelly, reprint 1963), pp. 307-311; M. M. Postan, "Credit in Medieval 
Trade", Ec.H.R., I (1928),1; reprinted in E. M. Carus-Wilson, Essays in Economic 
History. (London: Edward Arnold, 1954), Vol. I, pp. 61-87. 
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theoretically due in coin at a subsequent fair. The money supply was 
increased by the amount of credit granted. But, unlike coin which 
can pass from hand to hand quickly and fund a wide range of 
transactions in a short period of time, the credit served basically to 
fund a single transaction. That is its velocity was low. 
The second problem with the specie based explanation of the 
pnce revolution is that it ignores the effects of changing velocities 
of money. Here the revolutionary development was the assignment 
of bills and notes by the original payee to a third party. This was 
initially a simple "I will pay you when so and so pays me" kind of 
transaction with the original note sometimes transfered as 
security .ss 
Again this had only a marginal impact on money supply. Such 
transfers could not be extended very far because the actual payment 
had to be made to the original seller by the original buyer in order to 
initiate a sequence of payments in which all debts secured on the 
original payment would be settled. The farther removed from the 
original debtor one was the more likely it was that someone in the 
payment chain would default. Therefore there was a natural 
reluctance to take a bill which had passed through more than a few 
hands. At the time of settlement the money created was destroyed. 
It would then be recreated by a new set of transactions. The 
velocity increase while important was small. 
The introduction of endorsement created a major increase m 
the velocity of money. By the process of endorsement the right to 
55Jbid.; van der Wee, Antwerp, Vol II , pp. 337-354. 
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receive payment from the original seller was transfered with the 
debt instrument. This made the debt instrument into a currency 
backed by the credit of the original purchaser. This took control of 
the money supply out of the hands of mints and put it in the hands of 
merchants. In theory money could be created at the whim of the 
merchant who wished to extend credit. A single grant of credit 
could be multiplied to support a large number of transactions56. 
That is, the velocity of money had increased. 
This private creation of money was regulated by both civil and 
cannon law57 but the restrictions and safeguards varied from place 
to place and were, on the whole, ineffective in controlling the 
expansion of commercial credit. Governments universally restricted 
the legal outflow of coin across borders. They also aimed to a 
greater or lesser degree to maximize the inflow. This mcrease 
rather than diminished the importance of commercial paper. When, 
as was frequently the case, coin could not be exported to pay for 
goods purchased in a country, a merchant who was not selling goods 
in that country would have to purchase, from a third party, a bill 
payable in that country to complete his transactions. 
This need to match accounts payable and receivable both by 
country and by fair payable was a major stimulus to the financial 
trades. Banking, both deposit and merchant, bill discounting, bill 
brokering, currency arbitrage, and commodity speculation grew to 
unprecedented levels. Market manipulations and panics punctuated 
56van der Wee, Antwerp, Vol II., pp. 340-349. 
57Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance , pp. 41-44. 
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the growth through the 1520s to the 1550s. Nevertheless financial 
markets remained basically sound so long as they were engaged 
primarily in financing a growing volume of trade. 
The price revolution by 
. . 
increasing the expenses of 
governments faster than their revenues created an environment 
which made borrowing increasingly important to governments as a 
way of funding their ordinary as well as their extraordinary 
expenses. The same innovations in credit which facilitated the 
simultaneous increase in prices and drop in interest rates made 
borrowing more attractive to governments. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ANTWERP MARKEf 
The decline in the rate of commercial expansion began in the 
1520s. It was in part due to the expansion of Turkey, in part to the 
Valois/Hapsburg wars, in part to growing religious discord, and in 
part to an exhaustion of potential demand for goods. The slackening 
of commercial expansion was roughly coincident with an increase in 
the demand of governments for coin. The operation of markets for 
trade financing and government financing were fundamentally 
different. 
In sixteenth century conditions merchants showed a strong 
preference for credit over cash. This was primarily because of the 
expense and danger of transporting coin. Coin was heavy and bulky in 
relation to its value. The expense of moving large volumes, except 
by water, could be very great. Coin was also subject to theft. In an 
era when brigandage, and piracy flourished the private transport of 
large sums in coin was little short of foolhardy. The development of 
fairs as centers of exchange had allowed the creation of clearing 
systems which minimized the use of cash. The creation of 
exchanges to supplement fairs created a permanent market for debt 
instruments thereby increasing liquidity. 
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Merchants, unlike producers and consumers, needed very little 
cash relative to their volume of transactions. So long as a merchant 
continued in business the bulk of his money remained tied up in 
goods. Merchant to merchant exchanges could be carried out entirely 
through the exchange of goods or the exchange of credit instruments. 
Only at the retail level did coin have to be received. That coin could 
then be spent on consumption, on additional goods, or exchanged with 
a banker for a credit instrument which would then be negotiable. 
Governments, on the other hand, needed coin. Their expenses 
were primarily salaries and the cost of items actually consumed, 
whether food or gun powder, dressed stone or warships.58 As the 
pnce revolution progressed all of these things became more 
expensive. War especially grew more expensive at a rate which 
could not be met by normal revenue. Governments fought back by 
fixing prices59, inventing new sources of revenue, and enhancing 
traditional sources of revenue. All in all it was a losing struggle. 
Throughout the sixteenth century most governments expenses rose 
faster than revenues. 
Declining mercantile need for coin accompanied by the gradual 
increase in the specie supply freed large quantities of coin from 
financing trade and made them available for financing the pressing 
ssw.C. Richardson, The Report of the Royal Commission of 1552 
(Morgantown: West Virginia University Library, 1974) is an excellent example of the 
costs of a government and highlights the great need for cash. Essentially the only way 
for a government to function on trade credit was to delay payment of its obligations. 
The political costs of such a policy were considerable. 
59see for instance Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, Vol. I, p. 212. 
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needs of state, especially war. Governmental borrowing tended to 
clump in war time. Although most governments tried to live on their 
revenues in time of peace the effects of inflation and the frequency 
of war made it very hard for them to build adequate reserves to 
wage major wars. When war broke out it would normally be true 
that at least two of the major states would be borrowing 
simultaneously causing enormous pressure on the market. 
Another aspect of governmental borrowing was that the sums 
involved were almost always large. This meant in practice that only 
a few banking houses could compete in the market. This 
concentration of markets led to very close ongoing relationships 
between major European powers and their lenders.60 If the 
government were dependent upon the lender for his needs it was 
equally true that the lender, once he had committed a major portion 
of his capital to a government, was equally dependent upon that 
government's willingness and ability to repay. Governments stood to 
a considerable degree above the law. It was therefore common to 
have other banking houses, government officials, rich merchants, the 
diets of provinces, and especially cities guarantee governmental 
loans. 61 
Loans from banking houses to governments could be of several 
kinds. Interest rates varied with the life of the loan and the 
60The Hapsburg policy of making their bankers Councilors of the Empire, which 
gave them considerable judicial immunity, and of ennobling them was paralleled in 
England by the granting of corporate immunities to the Merchant Adventurers, 
Staplers, etc. and the knighting of men like Thomas Gresham. 
61Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 37. 
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security of the loan. A common device for raising cash which was 
much used by the Hapsburgs but never by the Tudors were the sale of 
annuities. Annuities, which were frequently perpetuities, were 
normally backed by specified revenues. These had the advantage of 
not contravening the Church's ban on usury.62 Under conditions of 
inflation the lender could hope that the pledged revenues would nse 
while the annuity amount remained fixed. The lender did not 
normally have to involve himself in the collection of the revenues 
but often did by purchasing the farm of those revenues. Interest 
rates on annuities were explicit. That is the annual payment and the 
amount of the loan were fixed and known. 
Another expedient was the sale of tax farms. This was to 
become increasingly important not only on the continent but also m 
England. In a period in which governments were small and their 
organization weak, it was frequently attractive to sell the right to 
collect certain taxes, as customs revenues, salt taxes etc. to a 
person or a syndicate of persons for a fixed term in return for a 
guaranteed payment stream. The sale might be for a one time price 
but more usually involved a one time price and periodic payments.63 
The most common type of credit transaction, after 1530, and 
the one used by the Tudors to the practical exclusion of all others in 
Antwerp was the Bourse, or floating loan. These loans were for 
short term at a rate of interest either explicit or implicit. Explicit 
interest rates were governed by statute. The maximum rate 
62Jbid, p. 43. 
63Jbid, pp. 37-38. 
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permitted at Antwerp was normally 12 % but the regulations were 
frequently suspended, or permitted to be 
sixteenth century to facilitate Hapsburg 
ignored, in 
borrowing. 
the mid-
Implicit 
interest rates may either represent the entire interest due on a loan 
or they may be in addition to an explicit interest rate. The most 
common form of implicit interest was to include in the loan the 
agreement for the lender to sell and the borrower to purchase some 
good, as jewels, fustian, alum, or gunpowder. The sale price would 
be artificially established at a high rate in order to increase the 
yield on the loan. Interest was often paid in advance, and terms 
rarely, if ever exceeded one year. As these loans were frequently 
rolled over annual renewal charges, fee penny, could raise the rate 
of interest far above the nominal rate. 
There were three major European money markets in the period 
1540-1560. These were Antwerp, Lyons, and Genoa. Antwerp and 
Genoa fell into the Hapsburg orbit while Lyons belonged to the King 
of France. Access to these markets was critical for raising loans at 
competitive rates. While the English government could and did 
borrow from its domestic merchants and from such foreign banks, 
chiefly the Italian houses of Bonvisi and Vivaldi, as were 
established in England, really large loans required access to one of 
the major European markets. 
There was a political cost involved in using Antwerp, Genoa or 
Lyons. In order to borrow and export coin one needed to have the 
permission of the sovereign power governing the market. Thus the 
English use of Antwerp was dependent on the Anglo/Burgundian 
alliance. Heavy borrowing was possible as long as it served the 
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economic, political, diplomatic, and military interests of the 
Haps burgs. 
ANTWERP 
The growth of Antwerp from a secondary port to the primary 
entrepot and bourse of Northern Europe was due to three factors. 
First, the decline of Bruges, after 1442, left merchants doing 
business in northern European looking for a new center. This decline 
was in part due to the silting of the Zwin at Sluys but mostly to the 
violent political struggles of the 1480s. The Emperor Maximillian's 
official transfer of English trade from Bruges to Antwerp in 1488 
was by means of punishing Bruges for rebelliousness.64 One should 
not however imagine a dramatic shift from the old center to the 
new. It was not until 1518 that the Florentines moved to Antwerp 
while the Genoese stayed in Bruges until 1522.65 The decline of 
Bruges did not guarantee the rise of Antwerp but it did make it 
possible. 
The second major factor was that the town government of 
Antwerp pursued a relatively free policy to foreign merchants. 
Their dwelling places and times were unrestricted, and the business 
in which they could engage were relatively unrestricted. In Bruges 
foreign merchants had never been permitted to reside year around or 
64R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada. The Emergence of the English Nation, 
1485-1588. (Harcourt, Brace & World: New York, 1966), p. 66. 
65R. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 233. 
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to engage in the wholesale side of business, money lending, etc.. All 
the more lucrative forms of business were monopolized by the 
citizens of the city. The establishment of resident foreign 
merchants in Antwerp and their active participation in and even 
dominance of wholesale business led to a concentration of 
international business activities not seen before or since in any 
city. Third, Antwerp succeeded because it became the center of two 
of the most important trading activities of the first half of the 
sixteenth century, the Portuguese spice trade, and the English cloth 
trade. Of these the more important in the early development of 
Antwerp was the Portuguese. The English trade, however, continued 
to grow as the Portuguese declined and by the 1540s was the most 
important single trade in Antwerp. 
The Portuguese established their agency in Antwerp in 1499.66 
When, in 1501, the Portuguese decided to decline Venice's kind offer 
to broker her spice business, they chose their Antwerp agency as the 
outlet for spices. This trade grew dramatically into the 1520s when 
the revival of the Venetian trade reduced its importance. By then, 
however, it had done its work in focusing European commerce in 
Antwerp. The spice trade brought together the merchants of all 
Europe at Antwerp, but especially the Iberians, South Germans and 
English.67 
66G. D. Ramsey, The City of London in international politics at the accession of 
Elizabeth Tudor, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1975), p. 3 ascribes 
the decision to the existence of a major metal market in Antwerp. 
67R. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 233; The decline in the security of 
seaborne trade in the Mediterranean following the fall of Egypt to the Turks, 1517, 
and their subsequent expansion in the Magreb revived overland trade in the 1520s and 
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The Portuguese spice trade was carried out on the basis of a 
single syndicate buying the entire yield of spices, usually in advance 
of deli very, for cash. This need to concentrate an enormous amount 
of capital at a single point made Antwerp the financial center of the 
North. The profits to be made in controlling a monopoly of spice 
attracted the Swabian bankers and eventually their Italian 
counterparts. The spice trade was still essentially a mercantile 
activity although the selling merchant was a government which 
relied on the syndicates of Antwerp to finance its operations. 
The presence of the main financial operators of the sixteenth 
century in Antwerp increased the importance of the city as a 
financial center. At the beginning of the century these transactions 
were primarily commercial. As the century wore on they became 
increasingly governmental. The rise of government debt was due to 
a series of events which each involved war. The Hapsburg wars to 
check the explosive expansion of the Ottomans after 1516, the 
Hapsburg/ Valois struggle for Italy, the religious wars in Germany, 
and the English wars with France and Scotland all required sustained 
financing in excess of the revenues of the powers involved. At the 
same time these wars disrupted trade and increased the risk of 
commercial loans. 
30s. This would have made some northern European river Port the center of trade. 
That this Port was Antwerp was due to the expansion brought about by the Portugese 
spice trade. For a brief discussion of trans-European trade see G. D. Ramsey, The 
City of London in international politics at the accession of Elizabeth Tudor, pp. 9-10. 
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Essentially eight types of government loans were made on the 
Antwerp bourse.68 Six of these were primarily for the benefit of the 
Hapsburg government. Of these two were in form official 
government borrowing. Bonds of the Court of the Netherlands bore 
the personal guarantee of Charles V and thereafter of the King of 
Spain. They were backed by specified revenues and the personal 
guarantees of officials, prominent merchants, and cities, especially 
Antwerp. The Bonds of the Provincial Diets of the Netherlands were 
regularly issued in anticipation of aides, that is taxes, already 
authorized but not yet collected. They were secured by the proceeds 
of the specified aide. 
Bonds of the Netherlands Receivers General were an 
intermediate case. They were the private bonds of the the 
Rentmeister of the different Netherland provinces. They were, m 
effect, moral obligation bonds of the Netherland's government but m 
law personal bonds of the tax farmers. As Hapsburg finances 
weakened down to the default of 1557 they declined in security. In 
the 1560s large numbers went into permanent default. 
The remaining three types of bonds were for the government's 
benefit but were not government obligations. Bonds of individual 
cities were issued chiefly on the governments account. They bound 
all burgers and their property as security for the debt. Private 
bonds of high officials were frequently used, especially after 1557, 
but also at other times of stress. Being backed by lands and goods 
68The following discussion of credit instruments is drawn primarily from R. 
Ehrenberg, Capital & Finance, pp. 248-250. 
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they frequently were more acceptable than other forms of 
government borrowing. Finally large banking houses issued bonds in 
their own names, and on their own security, for the government. 
That is, they borrowed money on the bourse and then lent it again to 
the government charging one to two percent for their guarantee. 
The only other significant governmental bonds traded on the 
Antwerp bourse were bonds of the King of Portugal for which his 
agent was personally liable, and bonds of the English Crown. English 
bonds were normally issued under the personal guarantee of the 
sovereign, individual Privy Councillors and the City of London. 
Frequently other guarantors were attached. These might be the 
Merchant Adventurers and Staplers, other banking houses, and 
individual rich merchants. 
All these bonds were tradable but none of them acted as bearer 
instruments. They could not be transfered by endorsement. The 
amounts were usually considerable. They carried substantial risk 
premmms over trade finance. These premiums of between two and 
four percent could rise much higher during times of war. The 
premiums permitted bankers to borrow at commercial rates and lend 
to governments at a profit. This process put a larger number of 
financiers at risk in government loans than at first appears. From 
1557 onward the risk premiums proved to be inadequate to 
compensate for the real risk. Of all the government instruments 
traded on the Antwerp Bourse the only class of bonds which never 
went into default were the Bonds of the English Crown. 
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THE ENGLISH AT ANTWERP 
The English cloth trade, while less dazzling than the 
Portuguese spice trade, was the mainstay of Antwerp's commerce 
from the 1530s through to the temporary shifting of the cloth mart 
to Emden in 1562. The trade was governed by a grant of privileges 
of 1446, a treaty of 1467, and the Intercursus Magnus of 1496. 69 
These treaties were a result of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance which 
had originated in the Hundred Years War. 
The organization of the English trade was through The Company 
of Merchant Adventurers of England. This "company", which received 
its final form in a charter of 1564, was an outgrowth of the 
Merchants of the Staple and of the Mercers Company of London. It 
may be said to have begun to form with a charter of Henry IV dated 
1407 which instructed the merchants trading in Holland, Zeeland, 
Brabant and Flanders to elect a governor to resolve their internal 
disputes and to represent them before foreign courts.70 
The authority of the governor was expanded by a charter of 
Edward IV in 1462 to allow him to enforce the statutes and 
regulations of the fellowship not only on its members but on "any 
other person or persones not being of said felyship offending or 
breaking any statuettes laws acts and ordinances. "71 This, in effect, 
690.R. Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers and the Tudor Commonwealth: The 
Formulation of a Trade Policy, 1485-1565", (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio State 
University, 1987), p. 6, pp. 146 ff. 
70Jbid. 7ff. 
71 Ibid. p. 10, cites Cotton Tib. D. VIII, 43f. 
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gave the nascent fellowship of Merchant Adventurers a monopoly on 
the cloth trade in the Burgundian lands. 
The importance of the Merchant Adventurers should not be 
underestimated. The company contained most of the important 
London merchants. That is, it contained most of the significant 
subsidy payers of London. London in 1526 already contained 11.1 3 of 
the assessed lay wealth in England. 72 It and the Merchant 
Adventurers were also the primary source of indirect taxation. From 
1559 to 1563, under the new Marian Book of Rates, London accounted 
for 88 3 of the nations cloth exports and paid 64 3 of total customs 
duties. 73 
The trade in cloth as organized by the Merchant Adventurers 
was the most important trade both for England and for the 
Netherlands in the period 1520-1564. It was conducted on a regular 
system with armed convoys being organized to carry the cloth to 
Antwerp to sell at two of the quarterly Antwerp fairs.74 These 
were the Pask Mart in the spring and the Cold Mart in the fall. 
All attempts to reconstruct in detail the course of English 
cloth exports are fraught with peril as accounts are fragmentary and 
chronologically inconsistent, but it is generally accepted that in the 
course of the first half of the sixteenth century London, that is the 
Merchant Adventurers and their rivals in the Hanse, increased its 
72R. Scofield, EHR 18 (1965), p. 508. 
73Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers", p. 44. 
74van der Wee, Antwerp, vol II, pp. 183-186. 
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dominance of the export trade in cloth from controlling something 
over 703 of the trade to controlling between 85 3 and 903 of the 
trade. 75 After 1552 when the Hanse was stripped of its right to 
export cloth all of the London trade belonged to the Merchant 
Adventurers.76 The brief restoration of the Hansard's rights under 
Queen Mary was followed in 1555 by the prohibition of Hansard trade 
between England and Flanders which reestablished the Adventurer's 
monopoly. During that period 1500-1551 cloth exports fluctuated 
dramatically year to year but showed an overall upward trend.77 
The Adventurers had only one staple, Antwerp. Therefore the 
vast majority of England's main export was shipped to a single 
destination where it passed out of English hands. This concentration 
of trade in a company whose privileged position was based not on 
economic advantage but on chartered privilege gave the crown great 
leverage over the Adventurers. At the same time the concentration 
of so much of the kingdom's wealth and foreign exchange earnings in 
the hands of a few citizens of London gave the City and the Company 
enormous leverage with the crown. The mutual dependency of 
Crown, City, and Company led to the fall of the Hanse in England, and 
the cooperation, however grudging, of the Company and City in 
funding the foreign debt. 
75E. M. Carus-Wilson and 0. Coleman, England's Export Trade 1275-1547, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 18-33. 
76D. R. Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers", pp. 99-138 gives an excellent 
summary of the last stage of the struggle between the Steelyard and the Merchant 
Adventurers. 
77see Appendix 
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The dependence of the English economy on Antwerp, and the 
dependence of the Netherland's economy on the importation, 
finishing, and reexport of cloth played a significant role in 
prolonging the Anglo-Burgundian alliance. Even while Charles V was 
locked in struggle with the heretics in Germany he maintained close 
ties with the main source of wealth in his Netherlands, the English 
Crown. 
The concentration of English interest at Antwerp made it a 
focus of English diplomacy as well as trade. While Stephen Vaughn 
was the first official Royal Agent at Antwerp, that function was not 
new.78 Vaughn, who was Governor of the Merchant Adventurers in 
Antwerp, acted as a source of political diplomatic, and military 
intelligence. He also acted as the crown purchasing agent and as the 
individual purchasing agent of a number of Privy Councilors, 
especially Paget, whose white damask enters into most of Vaughn's 
dispatches concerning loans in 1544-1545. 
The undifferentiated nature of the services performed by the 
king's agents in Antwerp needs to be remembered. However 
important the raising and paying of loans became after 1543, the 
crowns successive agents, Stephen Vaughn 1544-1547, William 
Dansell 1547-1552, and Thomas Gresham 1552-1557, remained 
important merchants on their own account, and performed a range of 
services as undifferentiated in their own way as those performed by 
the Privy Councilors. 
78J. W. Burgon, Gresham, vol. I, pp. 54-60. 
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THE TUDOR FISCAL SYSTEM 
The revenue system that Henry VII acquired upon his accession 
was based upon rents from demesne lands, feudal dues and incidents, 
and customs revenues. Henry's claim in blood to the throne of 
England was weak but his complete victory at Bosworth eliminated 
not only Richard III but most of his Y orkist kinsmen. The 
circumstances of his accession allowed him to vastly increase the 
royal demesne through confiscations. Of the 138 persons attainted79 
during Henry VII's reign 86 never had the attainder reversed in favor 
of their heirs. Their lands and property went to enrich the crown. 
Henry's marriage to Elizabeth of York gave his seizure of the Y orkist 
partrimony at least the form of legitimacy. 80 
Henry VII inaugurated a period in which "chamber" 
administration overshadowed the "ancient" organs of state, 
especially the Exchequer. This administrative structure reported 
directly to the king and depended upon the king for its efficiency. 
79 An Act of Attainder was a Parliamentary means of dealing with those judged 
traitorous by the Crown. The victim was corrupted in blood so that he could neither 
inherit or bequeath property. See especially H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English 
Nobility, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 38-75. 
80 J. Guy, "The Tudor Age", The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984) p. 272. 
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Under Henry VII, who was as much accountant as king, it worked 
well enough. 
The policy of increasing the royal estate was continued by 
Henry VIII. Attainder continued to play an important role m 
enhancing the royal desmene, especially following the Pilgrimage of 
Grace in 1536, with the suppression of the remaining Yorkist 
collaterals as the Poles and Courtneys in 1538, and with the 
suppression of the Howards in 1546. Henry VIII's greatest 
contribution to the self sufficiency of the crown came from his 
acquisition of clerical revenues and lands. This process is 
intimately linked with the King's Great Matter, the termination of 
Henry's supposed marriage to Catherine of Aragon, and with his 
Reformation of the Church. 
The results of this process of enlarging crown resources were 
dramatic. In 1485 the income of the crown had been roughly 
£32,000. By 1540 this had increased to in excess of £200,000. The 
ordinary expenses of the crown were, in 1540, approximately 
£145,000. This included the royal household and wardrobe, the 
salaries of officials, the mint, and the peacetime military 
establishment. The surplus was accumulated in the king's coffers.81 
With the increased revenue came a proliferation of revenue 
courts to collect, disburse and account for the new revenues without 
resort to the Exchequer. These new Cromwellian courts were the 
Court of General Surveyors, the Court of First Fruits and Tenths, the 
81 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", Smith College Studies in 
History. Vol. III, No. 2, January, 1918, p. 74. 
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Court of Wards and Liveries, and the Court of Augmentations. In 
addition the Treasurer of the Mint, the Court of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, and, until its merger with General Surveyors in 1547, the 
Treasurer of the Chamber were of major significance. 
In theory each of these courts was responsible directly to the 
king though in fact they rendered their accounts to the Privy Council 
from the time of Henry VII82. Also reporting to the king in theory 
and the council in practice were miscellaneous fiscal officers such 
as the treasurers for war and the king's agents in Flanders. The 
accounts of all these officers were normally audited and then 
approved by the Privy Council or at least by one or more Privy 
Councilors commissioned for that purpose.83 
There are three salient aspects of this system. First, there 
was no separation between the government and the crown. The 
ordinary revenues belonged to the crown, were accounted for to the 
crown, and their surplus entered the king's coffers.84 Second, the 
complexity of the fiscal system was such that the king could not 
personally oversee it. The responsibility for oversight had to be 
delegated. The practice of placing oversight with the Privy Council 
rather than creating a separate organization enhanced the 
importance of the council. It had both a centralizing and a 
82J. D. Alsop, "The Structure of Early Tudor Finance", C. Coleman and D. 
Starkey, eds., Revolution Reassessed. Revisions in the History of Tudor Government 
and Administration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 160. 
83 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 78. 
84G. R. Elton, Reformation and Reform pp. 214-215. 
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bureaucratizing effect. Third, the system operated without 
reference to or dependence on parliament. The king lived and 
conducted normal government on his own resources. Regular peace 
time taxation was, if not unknown, at least highly irregular.SS 
Ordinary revenues were not expected to cover the needs of war. 
To meet the cost of war the king might have recourse, through 
parliament, to direct taxation. This taxation could be of one of two 
types. The traditional form of taxation was the "tenth and 
fifteenth", that is a tax of one fifteenth of the moveable goods of 
those living in the shires and one tenth of the moveable goods of 
those living in cities and in the royal demesne. It had however 
become fixed at the sum of £32,00086. It therefore declined in value 
with inflation. 
The second form of parliamentary tax was the "subsidy". This 
tax was more flexible. It was a tax of two, three or four shillings 
per pound on landed income payable in installments over two to four 
years or of two shillings four pence per pound of moveable property 
payable in two years, which ever was higher. A subsidy yielded 
roughly £100,000 in the mid 1540s. Thereafter assessments became 
stereotyped and yield declined.87 
85G. L. Harriss, "Thomas Cromwell's 'new principle' of Taxation", E.H.R., No. 
CCCLXIX-October 1978 passim., ably states this case. J. D. Alsop, "Innovation in 
Tudor Taxation", E.H.R No. CCCLXXXII, Jan 1982 , passim, fails to rebut this key 
point. 
86 F. C. Dietz, "Finances if Edward VI and Mary", p. 70. 
87 Ibid. 
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These were not inconsiderable amounts of money. A subsidy 
collected in full over two years represented a 25 3 increase in the 
crown's revenue. A tenth and fifteenth represented a 163 increase. 
The money was not available in a single sum or immediately. The 
first needs of war had to be met by the king from his own coffers. 
Thereafter parliamentary taxation might afford relief. If the relief 
were not adequate other measurers were available. These included 
forced loans, sale of lands, sale of jewels and plate and borrowing. 
War was endemic in the sixteenth century. Europe was 
dominated by three powers. Of these one, the Hapsburg monarchy 
was a traditional ally of England through the Burgundian connection. 
The second, France, was the traditional enemy of England. The third, 
Turkey, was Islamic, militarist and expansionist. England figured a 
poor fourth, followed by a host of lesser but still important regional 
powers. 
Of the major powers Valois France was the most united, best 
organized and best funded. The Hapsburg lands, which included 
Austria, and the Burgundian Netherlands and which stood to inherit 
Spain, Naples, and Sicily upon the death of Ferdinand of Aragon, were 
a chance agglomeration united by dynastic marriage rather than by 
any feeling of common interest or identity. The Hapsburgs were 
chronically short of money even after the late 1540s when American 
specie became a major source of revenue. 
Hapsburg/Valois rivalry for control of Italy and dominance m 
Europe dominated European diplomacy and war from the beginning of 
the sixteenth century to the Peace of Cateau Cambresis, 1559. 
England, the minor German and Italian states, and the Papacy a11 
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played the part of make weights in this struggle. The Turks as the 
defacto ally of the French and the Protestant German princes on 
their own behalf kept the Hapsburgs from decisively concentrating 
forces against the French, especially after Pavia, 1525. In these 
struggles England played a major role. Three times, 1511-1514, 
1522-1526, and 1544-1547, England allied with the Hapsburgs to 
launch major attacks on France. Briefly, in 1528, England was de 
Jure at war with the Hapsburgs. 
Henry VIII's first two French wars, by dissipating the reserves 
accumulated by Henry VII in the king's coffers, undermined the fiscal 
stability of the English crown and led to dramatic efforts to create 
a new reserve capable of supporting war. 
THE WARS OF 1511-1514 AND 1522-1528 
Upon his accession to the throne in 1509 Henry VIII enjoyed a 
realm at peace, and amity with both the Empire and France. His 
father had left him a large sum of ready money and plate in the kings 
coffers, a budget which ran a surplus and a substantial pension from 
the King of France, the proceeds of Henry VII's intervention in 
Britanny, 1492.88 
While revenues were declining due to restorations of lands 
previously gained through attainder, to royal grants of land, and to 
the decline of the wool customs, the crown ran a small but 
comfortable surplus until 1511. This surplus was collected and held 
88 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance, pp. 56-57. 
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as jewels, plate or coin or was loaned to merchants and princes.89 
The full amount of the accumulation was very large, possibly 
£1,800,00090. Be this as it may, not much of it was cash. Plate 
could certainly be rendered into coin at the mint but precious stones 
had to be sold, and loans needed to be called in before they could be 
spent. 
The character and goals of Henry VIII have been much debated. 
I see him as having three overriding interests. Most important was 
the securing of a legitimate male succession. This did not become 
critical until the mid 1520s. Second was a desire to act the great 
king. Third was his interest in enlarging and consolidating his 
kingdom. The second and third goals led to war with France, first to 
gain glory and second to secure control of Scotland, France's ally, 
and to recover if not the crown of France then at least Normandy and 
Guienne. 
The diplomacy of Maximillian von Hapsburg and Ferdinand of 
Aragon succeeded in bringing Henry VIII to declare war on France m 
1511 and to invade that kingdom in 1513. The results of these 
efforts were modest, in part due to the perfidity of Henry's allies. 
The fiscal effects were anything but modest. The payments by the 
Treasurer of the Chamber for wages of soldiers and sailors, 
purchase of stores, purchase and maintenance of ships, and for the 
89p_ C. Dietz , English Government Finance, pp. 84-85, says that between 
1505 and 1509 £87,600 were loaned to merchants, that between 1491and1509 
£128,441 was spent on jewels, while at least £260,000 was loaned to the Hapsburgs 
and their Spanish in-laws. 
90Jbid. p. 86. 
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ordinance were £1,509 in 1511, £181,468 in 1512, £632,322 (plus 
10,040 crowns) in 1513, £92,000 in 1524, £10,000 in 1515, and 
£ 16,538 in 1516. In addition the Lord Treasurer handled loans and 
grants in excess of £65,000 to the Emperor between 1513 and 1516. 
The end of hostilities did not stop the outflow. The defense of 
Toumai, captured in 1513 required an additional £40,000 per annum 
from 1514 through 1518.91 
To meet these expenses Parliament granted three 15ths and 
10ths, and a poll tax in 1512. These were supplemented by subsidies 
in 1514 and 1515. Another 15th and 10th was granted in 1515 and 
the Church contributed four 10ths from Canterbury and three 10ths 
from York. Altogether these measures, which should have raised 
something on the order of £450,000, raised less than £300,000 at 
great political cost.92 The king's coffers had been drained of a 
significant portion of their surplus for little gain. None-the-less 
the fiscal effects should not be overestimated. Henry still had the 
resources to be a major lender of funds to his allies. The agreement 
of Francis I to pay, over time, 600,000 crowns93 for the recovery of 
Tournai in 1518 in part relieved Eng1ands financial embarrassment. 
Had a sustained peace ensued there is no real reason to assume that 
the crown could not have rebuilt its reserve funds. 
91 Ibid. p. 90. 
92Ibid. p. 93. 
93 Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations. Vol. I, p. 145, French 
crowns in common with other foreign gold coins circulated in England. Their value 
was set by proclamation. As of July 25, 1525 the value of the crown was set by 
royal proclamation at 4s 4d . 
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The renewal of war with France in 1522 brought a need for 
immediate money. The slow and grudging payment of Parliamentary 
taxes in the prior war made them an unattractive source of ready 
money. Instead Cardinal Wolsey, Henry VIII's chief minister and 
treasurer for war, resorted to forced loans. During 1522-1523 over 
£350,000 were raised in this manner. This sum still was £42,000 
short of the needs of war and the deficit was made good by the 
Treasurer of the Chamber.94 Immediate Parliamentary support was 
necessary if the war was to be continued. 
The forced loans of 1522 had been assessed as a tax on the 
basis of a new assessment of personal wealth. In 1523 Henry and 
Wolsey asked Parliament for a tax of 4 shillings in the pound based 
on the new assessment. This was to yield £800,000. Parliament 
turned mulish and granted a smaller subsidy .95 Convocation was 
more pliant granting one half of a years value of benefices to be paid 
over five years. New forced loans were exacted in the fall. None of 
this created enough cash to support major military efforts in 1524. 
Hostilities were suspended. 
Then, in February 1525, the French army was destroyed at 
Pavia and the king taken prisoner. Henry saw his chance to regain 
the Lancastrian territories in France if he could act. His, or 
Wolsey's, response was the Amicable Grant. The king required one 
94p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 93-95; J. Gairdner and R. H. 
Brodie, eds., Letters and Papers. Foreign and Domestic. of the Reign of Henry VIII. 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, various), III, 2750 
95 Letters and Papers 
Finance. p. 94. 
III, 3082; IV, 377; Dietz, English Government 
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sixth of a man's property to allow him "to conserve the honor of the 
realm and recover the crown of France". Opposition was general. 
There were still commissioners at large collecting the loans of 
1522, and commissioners collecting the subsidy of 1523. Now a 
third set of commissioners was sent to the same people.96 In the 
face of what came close to rebellion Henry and Wolsey withdrew the 
grant.97 
Peace had to be made, for the Imperials, under Charles V were 
unable to attack France. 98 Wolsey made good use of the peace 
negotiations to extract financial concessions from France. The 
French pension of 50,000 crowns per year from the Treaty of Etaples 
was to continue with arrears paid up and, in addition, the French 
crown agreed to pay another 50,000 crowns per year as indemnity 
and to cover miscellaneous debts of the French to Henry.99 
96Elton, England Under the Tudors. p 78; Dietz, English Government Finance. 
pp. 94-95, Letters and Papers, III, 3082. 
97Letters and Papers IV, 1235, The assembly of 20,000 men in Norfolk was 
dealt with by the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk. In 1549 the removal of these noblemen 
by attainder facilitated Kett's Rebellion. 
98The battle of Pavia had been precipitated by the choice between dispersing 
the Imperial army for lack of funds or attacking. Now the defeat of the French had 
restored the imperial credit but the peasants war in Germany required immediate 
suppression and Louis of Hungary needed help against the Turks. The peasants were 
suppressed but Hungary was crushed at Mohac in 1526. Charles V's brother Ferdinand 
was elected King of Hungary and the Hapsburgs were saddled with the Crown of 
Hungary and an endless struggle with the Turks. In addition Charles V broke his 
engagement with Henry's younger sister Princess Mary to wed the heiress to 
Portugal. Henry must have felt betrayed by his countrymen and doubly betrayed by 
his allies. A good basic treatment of this period is given in P.S. Crowson, Tudor 
Foreign Policy, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), pp. 59-73. 
99Letters and Papers II, 4476; III, 199; III 1508 Dietz, English Government 
Finance. p. 100. 
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In April 1527 Henry joined Francis in the League of Cognac 
against the Hapsburgs. This was the high point of Wolsey's 
diplomacy. Francis, no doubt desperate for allies, agreed to yet 
another pension. This time he was to pay 50,000 crowns per year in 
perpetuity to Henry's heirs as in recompense for the Valois holding 
the crown of France. In addition Henry was to receive 15,000 
crowns worth of black salt per annum. Henry had won, if not the 
crown of France, at least the illusion that his claim to France was 
acknowledged by the King of France. 100 
In January 1528 England was de jure at war with the Empire. 
In fact hostilities never commenced. By March trade had been 
resumed at Antwerp and in June a truce was made excluding Italy. 
This farcical war had the real cost of suspending Henry's French 
pension payments and requiring Henry to supply the French with 
approximately £60,000 in cash and jewels. England, exhausted could 
do no more.101 
The destruction of another French army in Italy in 1529 might 
have left both Francis and Henry fatally compromised had not the 
Turks besieged Vienna and the Lutheran Princes raised their famed 
Protest against the Interim at the Second Diet of Speyer.102 Peace 
was made by both parties with the Hapsburgs. 
lOODietz, English Government Finance. pp. 100-101. 
IOlwernham, Before the Armada, p. 118-119. 
102This was an imposed temporary settlement of religious issues to last until 
a general council of the church. It, in effect, violated the principle of the First Diet of 
Speyer that the princes should control religion in their territories pending a general 
council of the church. 
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Henry VIII's fifteen years of war had left him with an 
impoverished treasury, a disaffected populace, and a French alliance. 
His fiscal gains were composed primarily of pensions which bound 
him to the French alliance. The failure to pay the pensions would be 
doubly dangerous for Henry as it would not only signal a renewal of 
French hostility but also reduce his ability to wage war. 
THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 1528-1542 
The failure of Charles V to place Henry VIII on the French 
throne following Pavia and the jilting of Henry's sister, Princess 
Mary, were the first two steps toward the dissolution of the 
Hapsburg/Tudor entente. The third, and decisive step was Henry's 
decision to put aside his queen, Catherine of Aragon, aunt of Charles 
V, in favor of Anne Bolyne. Conservatives, like Stephen Gardiner, 
Bishop of Winchester, lost power and opportunists like Thomas 
Cromwell rose to power. 
On July 11, 1533, Henry VIII was excommunicated but the 
excommunication was suspended to permit a resolution. 
Maneuvering continued with Henry increasing his pressure on the 
interests of the papacy. From 1534 through 1538 Henry VIII's 
government, under the direction of Thomas Cromwell, moved to take 
control of the Church away from Rome and vest it in the crown. 
1534 saw Parliament used as a tool to strip Rome of its power 
in England. The Act in Restraint of Appeals established the principle 
that "England is an Empire" thereby terminating appeals to Rome. 
The Act in Restraint of Annates ended payments to Rome for the 
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consecration of bishops and a very few abbots. The Dispensation Act 
moved revenues from dispensations to the Exchequer. The Act of 
Succession removed the Princess Mary, daughter of Catherine of 
Aragon, from the succession and replaced her with Elizabeth, 
daughter of Ann Bolyne. The Act of First Fruits and Tenths 
established regular royal taxation of the church and increased the 
royal revenues by £40,000 per annum. The Act of Supremacy vested 
control of the Church in the person of the monarch as "supreme 
head", authorized royal visitations and moved appeals of cannon law 
cases out of convocation to chancery. Finally the Statute of 
Treasons made it treason to call the king, heretic or schismatic, and 
to fail to swear the Act of Succession. 
This was an enormous legislative program with major fiscal 
ramifications. The royal assertion of authority over the Church was 
complete. The king's coffers were swelled by the imposition of an 
annual income tax (tenths), and an entry fine on benefices (annates). 
The Exchequer benefited marginally from dispensations. Still, the 
power of the church lay in its great institutions and their 
endowments. These remained untouched. 
Henry's decision to carry on with the visitation of and 
valuation of monasteries in 1535 coupled with the Pope's 
exasperated decision to depose Henry and call on the French to stand 
ready to enforce the deposition brought doom to the monasteries and 
began a series of invasion fears which lasted through 1540. 
Under the circumstances Henry VIIl's government had a 
pressing need for money both to increase the level of preparedness 
and to augment cash reserves in case of the sudden outbreak of war. 
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The Tudor fiscal system of 1534 was not well adapted to achieving 
either of these ends. Normal revenues were too fixed while 
Parliamentary grants took too long to authorize and collect. One 
possible solution to this problem lay in transfering the assets of the 
church to the crown. Another possible solution lay in changing the 
basis of taxation to allow easier levying and faster collection. Both 
these options were to be exploited. 
The period of cold war which followed Henry VIII's break with 
the Hapsburgs in 1528 and the suspended excommunication of 1533 
imposed considerable immediate strain on the Tudor fiscal system. 
The coffers had been emptied by war. The surplus over ordinary 
expenses was very small. The danger of sudden war was perceived 
as great. The need to both fortify the realm and build reserves was 
therefore pressing. Thomas Cromwell and Henry therefore began a 
new effort to raise Parliamentary taxation. 
This innovative, if not entirely unprecedented, attempt to 
raise taxes in time of peace failed in 1532. In 1534, however, and 
agam in 1540 subsidy acts were carried in time of peace. The act of 
1534 and 1540 both rested their case primarily on the needs of 
defense but the act of 1534 also called for relief of the past 
"excessyve and inestimable charges" of the crown. The 1540 act 
sought relief for the charges in establishing the councils of the 
North, the Welsh Marches and the West. That is the two acts 
together began to establish a precedent for Parliamentary relief of 
past expenses and of ongoing non-war and even non-defense 
expenses. This was the beginning of a gradual process by which 
ordinary expenses to be paid by ordinary revenues shrank to being 
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the minimum expenses of Henry VII while extraordinary grew to 
encompass all other expenses.103 This process remained in its 
infancy through the reigns of Edward VI and of Mary. Non-war 
Parliamentary taxation was extremely unlikely to meet Henry VIIl's 
needs in the 1540s. 
How far the dissolution of the monasteries and the addition of 
the lands and plate to the royal estate was a matter of planned 
policy and how much a reaction to the pressing needs of the moment 
is unclear.104 In either case Henry's government proceeded with 
caution and under the form of law. In 1536 only small monasteries, 
those with rent rolls less than £200 per annum, were suppressed. 
The great houses remained under threat but untouched. However the 
threat to them coupled with the papal deposition and changes in 
religion under the Ten Acts of July 1536 sparked rebellion in the 
north. The Pilgrimage of Grace and Bigod's Rebellion posed a 
significant threat to Henry which he met with a fine mix of force, 
deceit, and reprisal. Their failure sealed the fate of the 
monasteries. A palliative retreat on the sacraments in 1537 was 
followed by a new visitation and suppression of the monasteries in 
1538 and by the September Injunctions against icons and 
pilgrimages and for the use of English in religious services. 
103J. D. Alsop, "The Theory of Tudor Taxation", passim. 
104 Professor Elton sees the dissolution as a part of a policy of reendowing 
the crown which originated with Thomas Cromwell. In this he differs from Professor 
Dietz who saw Cromwell's role not as a formulator of policy, the policy being Edward 
IV's, but as a provider of means. I see it as an emergency measure to provide war 
funding.and to eliminate the primary source of potential opposition to Henry's divorce 
and remarriage. 
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The suppression had three positive effects for Henry's 
government. First, it delivered as much as £3,000,000 in land and 
£80,000 in plate and jewels to the crown . .105 These were accounted 
for through a new statutory revenue court, the Court of 
Augmentations. Second, the wealth and manpower of the church was 
suddenly and effectively reduced below the level at which it could 
pose a realistic threat as a focus of rebellion. Third, the 
suppression of the monasteries removed from the Parliament all 
mitred abbots thereby establishing a large permanent lay majority 
in Lords. Fourth, it provided Henry with an enormous increment to 
the lands distributable as patronage.106 
The activities of Thomas Cromwell had achieved a marked 
improvement in the state of the King's revenue. The pre-
Cromwellian revenues of the crown remained substantial. The 
decline of Exchequer revenue, derived from the customs and 
miscellaneous feudal charges, from £40,000 to £30,000 after 1540 
is due to accounting changes in the Wardrobe. The Court of General 
Surveyors continued to clear approximately £38,000 per annum. The 
105F. C. Dietz , English Government Finance. p. 137-140 , cites Cott. Mss., 
Cleopatra E. IV 446-456 as estimating a yearly value of £135,000 on land. At a 
Henrician sale price of 20 years rent that would place the value at approximately 
£2. 7 million. At no time did the Court of Augmentations ever take in so much rent in 
one year. 
106F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 148 Between 1536 and March 
1539 estates valued at £11,633 a year were alienated "chiefly to men in service to 
the crown, like Pope, Sadler, Wriothesley, Seymour, Go stick and Cromwell". In 
return the crown received £46,000 and some lands. Had these lands been sold at the 
prices prevailing after March 1539 they would have yielded in excess of £200,000. 
For grants of land to the nobility in this period see H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English 
Nobility, pp. 221-253. She says "All recipients were important office-holders or 
men well known to Henry VIII through their service at court." 
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Duchy of Lancaster contributed £13,000. Wards and Liveries may 
have averaged £8,500. Including charges collected and expended 
locally the normal revenue of Henry VIII in 1540 before the additions 
made by Cromwell cannot have been much less than £100,000 per 
annum.107 
Cromwell's new revenue courts provided an impressive 
increment. First Fruits and Tenths handled not only the entry fines 
for benefices, first fruits, and the tithe on church revenues, tenths, 
but also clerical subsidies. Including £130,000 transfered into it in 
1535, this court's average contribution to the royal revenue was 
approximately £52,000 per annum from 1535 through 1539 and 
nearly £70,000 from 1540 through 1546.108 
Augmentations is a more difficult study. This is because 
Augmentations was largely involved with selling lands on a 
continuing basis but with major peaks of activity in war years. Net 
receipts of the Court of Augmentations were £108,028 for 1538/39. 
In the four years 1539/40-1542/43 they averaged £116,421. In 
1543/44 they rose to £253,312. In 1544/45 they declined to 
£139,152. In 1545/46 they were only £66,186. Professor Dietz 
calculated that the real average yield from rents through this period 
was £61,300. The rest of the revenue derived primarily from land 
sales with a small addition for sales of goods.109 
107p_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 137ff. 
108Jbid. 
109Jbid. 
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While Irish wars, defense preparations, the expenses of palace 
building, and an expanding household all put new stresses on the 
revenue, the king's coffers began to swell. Between 1535 and 1539 
the treasurer of First Fruits and Tenths transfered £59,139 to the 
coffers. The Court of Augmentations contributed £119,270 between 
April 1536 and March 1540. The subsidy and fifteenth and tenth of 
1534 seems to have passed directly into the coffers providing 
perhaps another £77 ,000. All in all Henry's ready resources 
increased by at least £250,000 from the suppression of the small 
monasteries to 1540.110 
The rapprochement between France and the Hapsburgs which 
began in 1537 with a truce raised invasion fears to new heights. As 
long as the two main continental powers had been at war England had 
been safe. In December 1537 a Papal bull of deprivation was 
promulgated in Rome. It seemed at least possible that the 
continental powers might unite to depose Henry. The war scare 
reached a peak in 1539 when Francis and Charles agreed to make no 
separate agreements with England. 
powers drifted back into hostility. 
Thereafter the continental 
Although Henry mustered men, built blockhouses and readied 
ninety ships of war his real effort was diplomatic. Cromwell sought 
a defensive pact with the German Protestant princes and sealed it 
with the marriage of Henry to Ann of Cleves, whose father not only 
controlled the lower Rhine but also disputed control of Gelderland 
with Charles V. At the same time the Emperor was offered an 
1 lOJbid. 
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alliance and Francis the cancellation of some or all of the French 
pensions which had not been paid since 1534.111 
The period 1540-1542 saw strenuous efforts to increase 
revenue. The Parliament of 1540 passed three major revenue acts. 
These suppressed the Knights Hospitalers and expropriated their 
possessions, granted a subsidy to be paid over two years and four 
fifteenths and tenths to be paid over four years, and confirmed the 
offer of the Convocations of Canterbury and York to pay four 
shillings in the pound on their revenues over the next two years. 112 
Henry also benefited in 1539-1541 from attainders. The attainder 
of Thomas Cromwell was followed by those of Lord Grey, the 
Countess of Salisbury, Sir John Neville, Lord Dacre of the South, and 
Mr. Mantell.113 
In 1542 Henry returned to raising forced loans with the 
"Benevolent Grant" and in 1543 obtained an additional lay subsidy 
and an additional clerical subsidy. Finally, in 1543 he made a final 
attempt at a new forced loan, the "Devotion Money" ostensibly to 
cover a 40,000 ducat loan to the Emperor. Despite expectations that 
the Devotion Money would exceed the amount of the loan, a mere 
£1,903 8s 3d was raised.114 
lllJbid. 
112p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 150. 
113H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 
1986) pp. 62-75; F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 150-151. 
114p_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 150-153. 
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The nation was neither willing nor able to pay more. A 
comparison of the coin supply and the intake of funds by the crown 
shows the magnitude of the tax and loan burden on the nation. The 
collections of lay subsidies and tenths and 15ths in February 1541 
and February 1542 netted £153,500. If one accepts J. D. Gould's 
calculation of the coin supply in 1542 as approximately £850,000 
then these two taxes alone brought funds equivalent to 
approximately 18 % of the outstanding coin in the realm into the 
crowns possession. Similarly the benevolent loan of 1542 brought in 
£112,229 an amount equal to an additional 13% of the nations coin. 
Much of the loan was however paid in plate, a sign of the shortage of 
coin.115 Had the kingdom been at active war, then the money would 
have been used to fund purchases. Instead the money was being 
accumulated to fund future war.116 
The great revenue enhancement measures of the inter war 
period had changed the nature of the crown's revenues only a little. 
Annates were a step toward regular peacetime taxation but only of a 
small portion of the population. Peace time taxes had been raised 
but only on the plea of impending war. In addition the taxes and the 
forced loans, which were tax equivalents, had been raised at such 
high rates as to unsustainable and therefore clearly extraordinary. 
No new means had been attempted to tap the wealth of the 
115Jbid., pp 151-165. 
116Letters and Papers, XVII, 194; The preamble to the forced loan of 1542 
make it plain that the king both had treasure in reserve and had no intention of 
spending it lest he "be disfurnished against any sudden event". 
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merchants. Instead crown revenues had become increasingly 
dependent on land rents and land sales. 
THE SECOND WAR PERIOD 1542-1550 
In the end the trading relationship between Flanders and 
England and England and Spain led to a ten month truce in 1541 
between England and the Empire. The death of Catherine of Aragon in 
1536 had removed one Hapsburg dynastic issue and the birth of 
Edward in 1537 another. Without a wronged aunt to defend and with 
Princess Mary's status in the succession less critical Charles found 
it easier to realign with England. 
At the same time France's alliance with Scotland was 
becoming increasingly irritating to Henry as Jam es V and Henry drew 
apart over issues of religion. Negotiations on the issue of subsidies 
proved fruitless and Francis objected to Henry's improvement of 
fortifications at Calais. The French were being equally intransigent 
on Italian issues. 
War began over a minor incident in Scotland and quickly 
escalated.117 The English victory at Solway Moss, November 1542, 
was quickly followed by the death of James V. The French began to 
prepare an intervention to uphold the rights of the dowager queen, 
Mary of Guise, and her infant daughter, Mary Stuart. Faced with this 
threat England joined the Empire in a league against the French and 
117 R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada. The Emergence of the English Nation 
1485-1588. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1966), pp. 149-152; 
Letters and Papers, XVII, 925. 
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Turks. This alliance, concluded February 11, 1543, was definitely 
offensive in nature. If Francis failed to make major concessions, 
Charles and Henry would invade France to restore Ducal Burgundy to 
the emperor and Normandy and Guienne to Henry. Francis could not 
yield and so the declaration of war followed on August 2, 1543.1 18 
All attention then focused on the great invasion planned for 
1544. Some 40,000 troops were to be mustered for an advance on 
Paris in concert with the Emperor. Wriothesley and Paget took 
charge of the finances for the war. Wriothesley estimated that 
£250,000 would be needed for the campaign. Of that sum £ 84,000 
were available from current revenue, £50,000 could be borrowed in 
Flanders, and £116,000 could be raised by various expedients 
without broaching the kings reserves.119 
Commissions were issued to sell the king's lands, and his lead 
stripped from the monastery roofs. Leases were made. Wardships 
were sold. Bondsmen were manumitted. Grants of land, subject to 
redemption, were made to citizens of London in return for loans. 
Exemptions from personal military service were sold. Proceeds 
from these measures exceeded £191,000 before Michaelmas (29 
September), 1544. Steven Vaughn, a governor of the Merchant 
Adventurers, was commissioned in March 1544 to start borrowing 
money. By the end of 1544 he had succeeded in borrowing 210,000 
crowns, approximately £70,000. 
118Ibid.; Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, pp. 320-321. 
119Letters and Papers, XIX, part I, 272. 
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The final source of revenue for 1544 was debasement of the 
coin. Edmund Peckham was made High Treasurer of the Mint. What 
followed in April 1544 was not an orgy of debasement. The fineness 
of the gold coin was reduced slightly. The fineness of the silver 
coin was reduced 103 and the rate of seignorage was increased. The 
actual yield to anyone tendering specie to the mint, whether as 
domestic coin, foreign coin, or plate was increased. 
The war had however cost not £250,000 but £650,000. This 
overrun far exceeded the funds planned for the war and appears to 
have exhausted the king's coffers. By autumn the king was clearly 
short of funds. The king's officers were urged to husband the money 
sent to them.120 Sir Richard Riche, treasurer of the armies in France 
complained, "the poor soldiers do here die daily at Calais of the 
plague and also of weakness for lack of victual." 121 Clearly 
something had to be done to increase the coin available to pay for 
the war. 
The English position was made especially difficult by the 
unhappy outcome of the campaign of 1544. Instead of marching on 
Paris, as was planned in 1543, Henry had sat down before Boulogne. 
Boulogne fell on September 14, 1544. On September 18, France and 
the Empire made peace. England was left to fight France alone.122 
120Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 510. 
121Quoted in Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 155. 
122wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 157-158. 
76 
Without reserves Wriothesley and Paget had to raise funds to 
provide the full cost of continuing the war in 1545. The situation 
did not appear desperate. No offensive actions were contemplated. 
In November 1544. Paget estimated the total cost of wages, 
victuals, and fortifications for the period December 1544-May 1545 
at £90,000. In addition £10,000 would be required for munitions, 
£4,000 would be required for Ireland and £40,000 would be required 
to retire the Flanders debt. Thus the total required through May 
would be £144,000. Of this total the subsidy to be collected in 
February would yield £100,000 leaving, by Paget's calculation, 
£64,000 to be raised. Paget argued that a benevolence, that is a 
forced loan, be practiced to make up the short fall for, as 
Parliamentary taxation would take too long. Parliament could not 
end before February 1545, the people could not know what had to be 
paid before the end of March. Collections could not begin for five 
months from the end of March. Therefore the meeting of Parliament 
should be delayed to September.123 
The benevolence would produce £50,000-£60,000 by the start 
of the campaigning season and leave an additional £50,000 to supply 
the needs of the summer without grieving the common people. The 
revenue required for June to November would be met by £40,000 to 
be levied in anticipation of the Parliamentary grants to be made m 
the fall and £50,000 in sale of lands.124 
123Letters and Papers, XIX, II, 689. 
124Jbid. 
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Unfortunately for this moderate program, the French made a 
very great effort in the Summer of 1545 both at sea and on land. In 
addition the Scotts scored a signal success at Ancrum Moor in 
February 1545 and in May 3,500 French troops, well supplied with 
money, arrived in Scotland.125 Through the summer of 1545 England 
had 60,000 troops under arms and eighty ships of war in 
commission. The renewal of offensive action against Scotland, 
under Hertford, in September 1545 was a harbinger of things to 
come. 
Altogether the wars cost £560,000 between October 1544 and 
September 1545.126 Paget's estimate of needs had totaled £284,000 
for that period. The cost overrun of £356,000 pounds had to be met 
out of other sources. Stephen Vaughn borrowed £128,929 Fl in 
Antwerp.127 Peckam increased the minting of debased coin. The 
mint's profits were something on the order of £80,000.128 
125Wernham, Before the Armada, pp 161-163. 
126Letters and Papers, XX, part II, 324 This information is contained in a 
letter from Wriothesley to Petre transmitting the declarations of the treasurers to be 
shown to the king. It contains two tantalizing references to the matter of debt. First 
"The Bonvix, etc. have written according to their promise.", that is the Bonvisi 
bankers, and "This day I sent the post to Mr. Vaughn touching Haller's matter." This 
Christopher Haller was a nephew of Wolff Haller von Hallerstein (d 1559), former 
agent of the Fugger in Antwerp (before 1531), sometime treasurer to Mary of 
Hungary (1531-?), and in the 1550s keeper of her privy purse. Ehrenberg, Capital 
and Finance pp. 176-177, 201, 226-227. 
127 That is about £108,000 at the October 1545 exchange. 
128C.E. Challis, "The Debasement of the Coinage, 1542-1551 ", Ec.H.R., 2nd 
ser., XX, No. 3 (1967), pp. 462-463 Comparisons of war expenses and mint income 
are complicated by the fact that the mint reported on an April 1-March 31 year while 
the treasurers reported on a Michaelmas basis. Only Tower I operated throughout this 
period. Its profits probably exceeded £70,000. The Southwark mint which opened in 
July 1545 may have contributed another £10,000. 
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Borrowing from the mint, that is delaying the delivery of coin to 
those who have rendered specie or coin for minting, rose to 100,000 
marks.129 Sales of land continued at a great rate. Parliament in 
November 1545 voted yet another step in the destruction of the 
medieval church by authorizing the expropriation of the chantries. 
The state of the crowns finances was summed up by 
Wriothesley in response to a letter from the Council, 14 September 
1545. 
This morning, between 4 and 5 o'clock, I received your 
letters of yesternight, signifying the levying of 4,300 
new men, and desiring preparation of money for their 
coats, conduct, &c., and my coming to court at my time 
appointed, or before. If my horse were here I would be 
with you this night; but I will set forth Wednesday 
morning. As to the money, I trust you consider what is 
done already. This year and the last the King has spent 
1,300,000£., his subsidy and benevolence ministering 
scant 300,000£.; and, the lands being consumed and the 
plate of the realm being molten and coined, I lament the 
danger of the time to come. There is to be repaid in 
Flanders as much and more than all the rest. The 
scarcity of com is such that, except in Norfolk, wheat is 
20s the qr., and little of it to be had. Though the King 
might have a greater grant than the realm could bear, it 
would do little to the continuance of these charges this 
winter, most of the subsidy being paid, the revenues 
received beforehand, and more borrowed at the mint than 
129Dietz, English Government Finance. p.156 A mark is usually 8 oz. Troy of 
silver. Therefore at the mint price of £2 l 6s Od prevailing in April 1545 this would 
have represented a loan of £186,667 from providers of silver to the mint to the 
government. On delays at the mint see Letters and Papers, XX part II, 729, 
Wriothesley to Paget, 5 Nov. 1545. Wriothesley says the delays are three to four 
months and longer. 
will be repaid these four or five months; and yet "you 
write to me still pay, pay, prepare for this and that." 130 
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The campaign season of 1546 was blessedly inactive. On June 
7 peace was concluded with France. Francis promised to pay the 
pens10ns owing to Henry VIII during his lifetime and those in 
perpetuity owing to his successors and to pay 2,000,000 crowns for 
the fortresses built at Boulogne and for arrears in pensions by 
Michaelmas 1554. Upon receipt of the 2,000,000 crowns Boulogne 
would be restored to him. Scotland remained at war with England 
but no major activity was undertaken. 
1546 was a year of retrenchment and recovery. The sale of 
crown lands halved from in excess of £160,000 to less than 
£75,000.131 The foreign debt was actually reduced by the not 
insubstantial figure of £94,000. This was possible in part due to 
the effects of the collections of the subsidy and the first 10th and 
15th granted by Parliament in 1545. These yielded £135,000 in 
1546. The main factor was however the mint. In June 1545 a 
subsidiary mint had been opened at Canterbury. It was followed in 
July by a mint in Southwark and a second mint in the Tower. In 1546 
mints at Bristol and York were added. The output of these mints and 
their profit to the crown rose swiftly as debasement accelerated132. 
The death of Henry VIII, 28 January 154 7, brought the nine year 
old Edward VI to the throne. The first three years of his reign were 
130Letters and Papers, Vol. XX, part 2, 366. 
131f. C. Dietz, English Government Financ~ p.149. 
132See Tables I, II, and III, above. 
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dominated by Edward Seymour, uncle to the king, First Earl Hertford, 
who, as Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector, continued the war 
with Scotland and thereby renewed the war with France. These wars 
cost a total of £1,386,687 .133 These charges along with a 
significant increase in the expenses of the householdl34, the effects 
of fraud at the mints and in the revenue courts135, and a self servmg 
policy of land grants by the Privy Council to itself in the name of the 
Kingl36 continued to impose enormous fiscal stress on the 
government. 
The inherent weakness of Somerset's government was largely 
to blame for the difficulties of 1547-1550. Henry's will did not 
leave him in a position to legitimately exercise what was in effect a 
regency. He therefore had to dispense patronage on a large scale. 
That meant allowing the Privy Councilors to enrich themselves, a 
weakening of audit controls, and an unwillingness to use politically 
unpopular revenue measures. 
133Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 182, cites State Papers Domestic, 
Edward VI, XV, 11. 
134 F.C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p 190, Household expenses 
increased from £38,804 in 1547-48 to £56,806 in 1550-51 and then declined to 
£51,903 in 1552-53. 
135p. C. Dietz, "Finance of Edward and Mary". pp. 78-80, Dietz gives an 
admirable short account of the frauds and the accounting methods that made them 
feasible. 
1361bid., p.77, Lands to the annual value of £27,000, that is with a capital 
value of £540,000 were granted in the seven years of Edward Vi's reign with rents of 
£3,619 reserved to the crown. 
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The continuing wars however required major revenue 
enhancements. These were supplied primarily by the mint, by the 
sale of lands through the Court of Augmentations, and by additional 
foreign loans. Somerset did attempt a Parliamentary tax, the Relief 
of 1548. This tax was levied on a revolutionary basis. Instead of 
being based on land it was assessed on sheep and wool based upon an 
estimate of sheep in the realm based upon the wool customs of 
Edward Ill. It was intended to yield between £106,000 and 
£156,000. Instead it yielded less than £54,000 in 1549 and only 
£47 ,500 in 1550.137 
The fall of Somerset in 1549 consequent to Kett's rebellion 
ended the war period. Peace was made with France and Boulogne 
returned for 400,000 crowns, approximately £133,333.138 All told 
the wars had cost £3,500,000139 The net yield of taxes and forced 
loans not repaid between 1544-1551 was only £976,000. The sale 
of crown lands realized £1,048,255 between 1544 and 1554. The 
debasement of the coin earned £1,270,000 between 1544 and 
1551.140 The debt in Flanders had grown from nothing in 1544 to 
£132,000141 War had consumed the state. 
137Jhid. p. 84-85. The basis for the assessment is explained in footnote 87 at 
the bottom of page 84. 
138Jbid., p. 89. 
139p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 147, 182. 
140c. E. Challis, "Debasement", p 454. 
14lp_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 191 n 9. 
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NOR1HUMBER1AND AND MARY 
Northumberland's government attempted to confront the fiscal 
crisis. The Privy Council launched a series of investigations of the 
royal revenues to establish a basis for reform. The most important 
of these was the Revenue Commission of 1552 which studied in 
detail the regular sources and uses of the kings funds. Its 
conclusions highlighted the seriousness of the revenue shortfall. 
After fixed charges grants and annuities, the crown had available 
£168, 150 per annum. From this sum had to be deducted normal 
government payments for officials and ministers, the household and 
wardrobe, the charges for the audit courts, and the charges for 
permanent garrisons totaling £131,600. This left a clear account of 
£36,550 with which to meet the charges of the admiralty, the 
ordinance, the privy purse, the New Years gifts, the charges of the 
household in excess of its assignments, and the charges of Calais 
and Ireland. The peacetime expenses exceeded the normal revenu~s 
by a sum in excess of £60,000 per annum.142 But this was not all. 
The realm was nearly defenseless for lack of money. It was 
immediately necessary to service and if possible retire £250,000 in 
debts of which £132,000 were owed in Flanders.143 
Until substantial reforms could be undertaken there was 
simply no way to meet the ordinary charges of government, short of 
142w. C. Richardson, ed., The Report of the Revenue Commission of 1552, p. 
157; Dietz, English Government Finance.. 190-191. 
143w. K. Jordan, Edward VI. The Threshold of Power, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin,1970), p. 457. 
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taxation, without a continuation of debasement, the sale of 
additional lands, or a renewed attack on the church's remaining 
assets. Taxation was, if not out of the question, politically risky. It 
would have required summoning Parliament to ask for a peacetime 
tax. 
Dietz stigmatized Northumberland's government as follows. 
"In the expedients which were used to remedy this alarming 
deficiency, resort was had to all the old devices, betraying a 
sterility of ideas and a failure to grasp the cause of the 
situation."144 This was unfair. 
The duke's government did focus on retrenchment, debt 
collection, and stricter accounting. Costs were reduced. Soldiers 
and workmen were discharged and the expenses of the household 
reduced. Both the Flanders debt and the domestic debt were reduced. 
Northumberland inherited an Antwerp debt of £132,000 while Mary 
inherited only £61,000.145 It is true that Northumberland resorted 
to a final major round of debasement in April 1551 which made 
£114,500 for the crown, but it also true that in October 1551 he 
restored the fineness of the new silver coin to approximately that of 
1526.146 
144F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p.191. I suspect that this was 
largely an attack on Pollard as the language is essentially the same as he used to 
describe Mary's government. 
145D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1979) p.183; J. Guy, Tudor England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 
217 says, "Borrowing was initially extended but-partly thanks to manipulations of the 
foreign exchanges by Thomas Gresham £132,372 in Flanders and £108,800 in England 
were repaid by 1553." I cannot determine the source of this inconsistancy. 
146J. D. Gould, Debasement p. 12. 
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What Dietz really undervalued was Northumberland's 
determined effort to reorganize the fiscal administration. His 
efforts toward reducing the complexity of administration and 
concentrating oversight and policy formulation in the Privy Council. 
This led, in March 1553, to an Act for the Dissolving, Uniting, or 
Annexing of certain Courts, which would have amalgamated First 
Fruits and Tenths, and Augmentations with the Exchequer, thereby 
bringing the bulk of receipts and the bulk of payments into a single 
court.147 
Whether the combination of cost reduction and administrative 
reform pushed forward by Northumberland would have worked cannot 
be known. The reality of royal insolvency in the summer of 1552 
required the sale of crown lands for £144,259 in the last six months 
of the reign.148 This in itself was insufficient. William Cecil 
proposed a new export levy on cloth to raise £40,000, an idea that 
died at the time but shows that the sort of thinking that led to 
Mary's new Book of Rates was already current in Northumberland's 
CounciI.149 Parliament had to be summoned in March 1553. Not 
without opposition, a peace time grant of a subsidy and two 
fifteenths and tenths was made.ISO 
147J. Guy, Tudor England p. 216-219. 
148w. K. Jordan, Edward VI. Threshold of Power, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1970), p. 463. 
149Jbid. p. 457. 
150W. K. Jordan, Edward VI: The Threshold of Power, pp. 508-509. 
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The accession of Mary, did little to change the direction of 
government policy. William Cecil was removed from the council but, 
after a period of hesitancy, Winchester was retained as Lord 
Treasurer, Peckham was retained at the mint, Sir John Baker was 
retained as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Walter Mildmay was 
retained at Augmentations, and Sir Thomas Gresham was retained in 
Flanders.151 
This continuity of key individuals in office led to a very high 
level of continuity between Northumberland's administration and 
Mary's. The amalgamation of Augmentations and First Fruits into the 
Exchequer was reauthorized and carried through. After a two year 
mcrease in the household expenses (1553-1555) expenses were 
reduced from a peak of £62,640 in 1553-1554 to a minimum of 
£36,208 in 1557-1558. The expenses of the wardrobe were 
stabilized at something over £6,000 per annum. Payments of 
pensions and annuities were brought down to £5978 from Easter 
1557 to Easter 1558 compared to a cost of £20,000 per annum under 
Edward.152 
On the revenue side the Marian administration was more than a 
mere continuation of its predecessor. Net land alienations ceased. 
The attainders against Northumberland were offset by grants to the 
Howards, Percies, and others who had suffered under Henry VIII and 
Edward VI. The management of the remaining estates was improved. 
Rents and entry fines were increased to compensate for inflation. 
1510. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 190-191. 
152c. F. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp 202-205. 
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This was a long process because of the normal lease term of 
approximately 20 years but a start was made. The clear yield of 
lands in Augmentations rose from £26,883 in 1552-1553 to £47,723 
m 1556-1557.153 This increase continued into Elizabeth's reign. 
Finally and most importantly the customs were reformed. The 
valuations for customs purposes had not changed from those of 
1507. As a result of the inflation the value of customs revenues had 
declined. Moreover nominal revenue had declined due to changes in 
the mix of exports away from wool to clothes and from traditional 
cloth to new draperies. Mary had the right to increase import duties 
but in former times export duties had been negotiated with the 
merchants. The decision to increase the export duties by more than 
100% led to the referring of the matter to the courts which ruled 
that as the sovereign had the right to forbid exports she also had the 
right to tax them "de son absolute power." On May 28, 1558 the new 
book of rates came into effect. At a single blow it increased 
customs revenues from approximately £30,000 to in excess of 
£80,000.154 
In the matter of the Flanders debt Mary's policy followed a 
different course than Northumberland's. Upon her accession Mary's 
greatest need was for cash. Inheriting a debt of £61,000 she 
expanded it by October 1554 to over £150,000,155 By January 1556 
153Ibid. pp. 205-206. 
154Ibid. pp. 208-209; D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 415-418. 
1550. M. Loades, The Reign of Mazy Tudor, p. 201. 
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that had been reduced to £109,013. When Thomas Gresham closed 
his accounts in August 1557 the debt had been eliminated. The 
renewal of war in 1557 called the debt back into existence. On 
Mary's death she left Elizabeth an Antwerp debt of £90,000. 156 
156Jbid., p. 420. 
CHAPfERVI 
THE FLANDERS DEBT 
1544-1550 
Henry VIII's Flanders loans played only a modest role in 
financing the first phase of his third war with France. They were 
important because they provided ready money in the theatre of 
operations. Bedeviled, as always, by the delay between the 
proclamation of forced loans, Parliamentary grants, and land sales 
and the collection of coin, Henry needed to tap new sources of com. 
The solution was, as it had been repeatedly for Charles V, to borrow 
money in Antwerp. To this end Stephen Vaughn, a governor of the 
Merchant Adventurers157, and the King's Agent in Flanders, was 
commissioned, in May 1544, to "take up" 100,000 ducats monthly in 
Antwerp.158 That would have been in excess of £30,000 per month. 
It appears that Wriothesley's estimates of cost were already proving 
overly optimistic by May. 
157The Merchant Adventurers had two governors, one in London, and one in 
Antwerp. Vaughn was the Antwerp governor. , Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 
251. 
158The single ducat had been set by proclamation at 5s in July 1538 and were 
therefore equivalent to a crown. Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, Vol I 
p. 264. The fiat value of foreign gold pieces was not expressly effected by the 
revaluation of 16 May 1544, Ibid., p. 327. 
89 
The Regent, Mary of Hungary, also bedeviled by the slow 
collection of taxes, was alarmed by Henry's wish to borrow in 
Flanders. She wrote Chapuy's, the imperial ambassador in England: 
"If the King were then to raise money here it would much 
impede the Emperor's affairs, who cannot bring money 
out of Spain without risk, whereas the king can safely 
conduct money from England; here also a great part of the 
aids have to be raised "par finance", as they are not paid 
as promptly as needed." 159 
She however told Chapuys to inform the king, 
..... she desires nothing so much as that he might get all he 
needs, provided the Emperor's affairs are not impeded 
thereby, but that, for the aforesaid reasons, the levying 
of money here would much hinder them, and she would 
pray him to levy it in his own realm.160 
The regent was not overstating the case. She was in the 
process of raising enormous loans in Flanders, mostly on the credit 
of the Receivers General but also on the credit of the cities 
including Antwerp, in Charles V's behalf. In this process her 
principal agent was Gaspard Ducci, a Florentine banker, and 
arbitrager of somewhat unsavory reputation. He had raised £1.2 
million Flemish for Charles on the credit of the City of Antwerp in 
1543, and was to raise an additional £3.5 million Flemish for the 
Hapsburgs in 1544. He also invented a new export tax and became 
its first farmer.161 With such large financial measures in hand the 
159Letters and Papers, XIX, part I, 578. 
160Jbid. 
161For Gaspard Ducci's activities see Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, pp. 
146-271. 
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Regent's displeasure at the English entering the market was not 
surpnsrng. 
Professor Dietz said, refering to Vaughn's entry into the 
market, "No real opposition, however, was made to Vaughn's 
operations. He fell in with a broker or intermediary, Jasper Douche, 
through whom he was brought in touch with merchants and bankers 
who had money to lend." 162 This explanation is unsatisfactory on 
two accounts. First, as the Governor of the Merchant Adventurers, it 
is inconceivable that Stephen Vaughn was so ill informed of matters 
on the Bourse that he needed Jasper Douche to tell him who had 
money to lend. Second, this Jasper Douche was Gaspard Ducci. 
Apparently Henry had received permission to borrow, but only 
under the strict supervision of the Regent's chief financial agent. 
Vaughn employed the services of Jasper Douche as a broker, but 
Douche's real master remained the Hapsburgs. Vaughn made at least 
one attempt to borrow around Jasper Douche but to no avail. He was 
simply refered back to Jasper Douche. Antwerp was the Hapsburg's 
credit market and Jasper Douche was their agent. No substantial 
loans could be taken up without his consent. 
Douche arranged loans of 122,778 crowns from the Welser163 
for nine months at a rate of 10 1/23 or 143 per annum. This first 
162F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 167. 
163 For information on the Welsers of Augsburg see R. Ehrenberg, Capital & 
Finance in the Age of the Renaissance, a Study of the Fuggers and Their Connections, 
translated by H.M. Lucas, (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1963) especially p. l39ff; 
The Welsers had already loaned 800,000 crowns to the Emperor but, according to 
Vaughn,17 June 1544, were "not yet empty". Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 725. 
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loan was followed by other smaller loans. By the end of 1544 
Vaughn and Douche had raised a total of only 210,000 crowns net, 
that is with the interest deducted in advance164 Maturities on 
Vaughn's borrowing extended from December 1544 to February 1545. 
Attempts to raise more loans failed. Douche advised Vaughn, who 
advised the Council, December 19, 1544, that the best means to 
raise additional money was to borrow goods, "as pepper and fustians, 
which may be uttered again for ready money" on the credit of major 
London merchants, especially "both the Greshams and Ralph 
Warren" .165 While this particular expedient was not used at this 
time it will recur later. 
The English loans were secured in the same cumbersome 
fashion as were imperial loans. First a merchant, or banking house 
had to guarantee the king's bonds against default. The credit of 
neither the Staplers nor the Adventurers was acceptablel66 and so 
the Vivaldi and Bonvisi houses were pressed into service167. The 
bankers in turn were guaranteed by individual Privy Councilors 
including, Wriothesley, the Duke of Suffolk (who was closely 
associated with the Bonvisi), and Sir Anthony Brown. In addition Sir 
Richard Gresham and Sir John Gresham guaranteed the Italians.168 
164Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 822. 
165Letters and Papers, XX, part II, 764. 
166Jbid., part II, 630. 
167These were long established in England and the Bonvisi continued to play a 
significant role into the 1570s. Ehrenberg, pp. 226-227. 
168Dietz, English Government Financ~ p. 167; Letters and Papers, XIX part I, 
630, 725, 759. 
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As always with sixteenth century floating loans the coin had 
scarcely been taken up when the issue of repayment became 
pressing. In June Vaughn approached the Weiser with the proposal 
that they buy lead from the king to fund the repayment of their loan. 
In July Vaughn urged the Council to send a stock of lead to Antwerp 
to improve the government's credit. However, the price of lead fell 
and Vaughn urged, at the end of August, that it would prove cheaper, 
in light of the high transportation costs, to renew the December 
loans until February than to sell lead at a loss on a depressed 
market.169 This was accomplished through the agency of Jasper 
Douche, who appears to have received, in return, permission to 
transport certain jewels into England, free of customs, to sell 
either on his own account or for the account of the Fuggers.170 
As the new day of payment approached, means of payment 
without exporting coin were again sought. Paget had the idea of 
using the proceeds of the Merchant Adventurer's sales at the Cold 
Mart of 1545 to repay the loans. This idea was to recur over the 
next twelve years and was to become an important element in debt 
service. It would not serve in 1545 as the debt was due on February 
169For the negotiations concerning the lead see, Letters and Papers, XIX, part 
II, 119, 143, 743; XX, part I, 1261, 1265; part II, App. 41. The negotiations on the 
lead were to drag on until July 1545 when Vaughn succeeded in arranging with a group 
of Spanish merchants the exchange of lead at £4 13s 4d the fodder (2184 lbs) for 
30,000 quintals (3,000,000 pounds) of alum at 13s 4d the quintal, customs duties to 
be paid by the Spaniards. This is an example of the lack of separation of official trade 
and state finance which typify Henry's and Edward's dealings at Antwerp. This deal 
turned out to be unsatisfactory due to the large amount of alum depressing the English 
market. 
170Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 755. 
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10 while the Adventurers could not receive payment for another six 
weeks. Vaughn did attempt, unsuccessfully to discover the amount 
owed to the merchants due on February 10 but was unable to do so 
secretly.171 In any case, the merchants, "fearing the last peace 
between the Emperor and the French king, took wares beforehand for 
the greater part of their debts owing this Cold Mart." 172 That is, the 
merchants, fearing a disruption of trade due to diplomatic changes, 
sold their bills on the bourse and purchased goods. This effectively 
forestalled any attempt to use their funds to service the debt. 
On February 10, 1545 the loans were repaid in full out of 
Henry's domestic revenue. The fiscal situation was such that funds 
had to be assembled from a multiplicity of sources. Funds were 
scraped together from the Exchequer, Augmentations, the Treasury 
of the Chamber, First Fruits and Tenths, and the mint.173 
Presumably the payments were 2/3 gold and 1/3 silver, the standard 
imperial repayment terms.174 This, according to Dietz, established 
the king's credit.175 
The payment terms enjoyed by the English government were 
slightly better than the terms Douche arranged for the imperial 
government. The emperor paid 12% interest plus 1 % per fair. As 
171Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 751. 
172Jbid, XIX, part II, 795. 
173ibid, XX, part I, 154; XXI, part I, 716 (4), (5). 
174Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 756. 
175p_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 170. 
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there were four fairs in the year this made 16% per annum.176 The 
English paid only 14 % . The English had to make the payment in the 
same manner as the emperor, that is 2/3 gold and 1/3 silver.177 
This first group of loans had been intended to be simple 
revenue anticipation loans. As Wriothesley intended to wage the 
war without drawing on the king's reserves, coin was needed for the 
war in advance of the receipts of Augmentations and the profits of 
the mint. The proceeds from the loans were spent directly on the 
invasion of France. They were used for the expenses and pay of the 
army invading France, for the hire of wagons, and for the purchase of 
munitions.178 
Unfortunately the war had cost more than 2 1/2 times 
Wriothesley's projection. Between their inception and their due date 
the loans had become a major burden. Other means of repayment 
were sought, but the situation was not yet so bad that money could 
not be pulled together to liquidate the debt. 
The second round of loans was different. With the King's 
credit, if we are to believe Professor Dietz, now established,179 
176Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 66. 
177Van der Wee, Antwerp, vol I, p. 120; vol II., p. 203. 
178,Letters and Papers. XIX, part I 822, 859, 887, 1099 and, ibid, part II, 
108, 160, 220. 
179p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance, p. 170 ; As we shall see, this 
was a very optimistic assessment of the King's credit. Despite major efforts to 
negotiate loans Stephen Vaughn managed to complete one significant loan in 1545. 
Dietz based his opinion on Vaughn's report , Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 154 This 
acceptance of a single report by Vaughn as an established fact is unfortunately typical 
of Dietz. 
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Douche moved to raising money from the Fuggers who were willing 
to accept the guarantee of the Merchant Adventurers, the Staplers, 
and the king. The Fuggers lent Henry VIII a nominal 300,000 crowns 
composed of 260,000 gold crowns at 10% with an additional 2 % 
charge to dispense with repayment provisions specifying repayment 
m Carolus gilderns and crowns180, and 40,000 crowns in jewels at 
an unknown profit.181 This loan was actually concluded on the credit 
of the City of London, and the Merchant Adventurers. The exemption 
from repaying in gold crowns was important. There was a coin 
shortage in the Netherlands due to the war and the consequent 
interruption of coin and specie deliveries from Spain.182 
The Flemish believed that the proceeds of the loan were bound 
for the mint.183 If this was true then it could have been reminted at 
a 6% profit at fiat value to Henry.184 This would have effectively 
reduced the interest rate to something over 4 % depending on the 
actual value of the jewels received, given that the exchange rate 
180That is to say, the Fuggers were willing to accept the exchange risk in 
accepting repayment in English or other coin rather than in "valued gold", coin with an 
established fiat value in the Netherlands. 
181f. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 170; Letters and Papers, XX, 
part I, 13, 892, 996, 1316; part II, 36, 114, 333, 362, 595, 707. 
182Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 578. 
183p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 170; Letter and Papers. XX, 
part II, 262 seems to support Dietz's contention but Wriothesley's language is 
sufficiently guarded to leave some room for doubt. Vaughn in Letters and Papers, XX, 
part II, 388, which relates to the actual arrest of coin in September 1545 ascribes 
the Flemish fear of melting to his position at the mint. 
184 Gould , Debasement p. 12. 
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between Antwerp and London remained stable. The Flemings opposed 
the export of coin for melting but permission was finally obtained 
and the coin was allowed to depart.185 How much of it reached the 
mint is problematic. 
Vaughn entered into extensive negotiations with Christopher 
Haller for additional loans.186 The amounts sought varied over the 
time of the negotiation but were initially 40,000 crowns, and in the 
end 100,000 crowns.187 These negotiations proved abortive for 
several reasons. In the first place not all of the money would be 
available in Antwerp. Half of it would have to be received in 
Frankfort, a great inconvenience when the money was truly wanted 
at Calais.188 Second, the Haller required not only the guarantee of 
the City of London and the king but also those of no less than four 
Italian banking houses established in London. When these guarantees 
were forwarded Christopher Haller changed to asking that the 
guarantors be in Antwerp. This portion of the negotiation was 
hampered by the refusal of the Antwerp Bonvisi to support the 
London Bonvisi, having suffered some form of falling out. Third, the 
English wished to have delivery changed to Calais to avoid the arrest 
of their funds by the Hapsburgs. Fourth, by October, the Haller were 
185Letters and Papers, XX, part II 407, 507, 550. 
186Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 1214,1223, 1316 (1, 2), 1317,1333; part 
II, 9, 36, 74, 92, 111, 113-4, 153, 192, 217, 243, 258, 284, 302, 324, 333-4, 
340, 355, 362-4, 340, 355, 362-4, 374, 388, 443-4, 507, 551, 565, 597, 654-
5, 694. 
187Jbid, part II, 9, 694. 
188Jbid, part II, 36. 
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no longer willing to loan the full amount in coin but wished the 
English to take 25,000-30,000 crowns in jewels.189 
These negotiations are revealing for at least two reasons. 
First, the coin shortage in Antwerp must have been becoming acute 
by August 1545. The Haller' s wish that coin be taken up in Frankfort 
pointed in this direction as did the switch to jewels in October. 
Second, the diplomatic situation was clearly deteriorating. Henry 
VIII's breach of his agreement with Charles V to make Paris the goal 
of the campaign of 1544 had guaranteed an indecisive campaign 
which the Emperor, who wished to disable France so that he could 
turn against the League of Schmalkalden, could not afford. When a 
separate peace was concluded between France and the Empire on 
September 19, 1544, the decline in amity led to the fear that the 
king's money would be "arrested" _190 
This was delayed until the death of the Duke of Orleans 
removed the French threat in September 11, 1545.191 At that point 
the Fugger loan was still not entirely in hand and the chances of 
completing the Haller loan declined dramatically. The king's funds 
were actually arrested on September 20. Negotiations succeeded in 
gaining the release of the funds but all coin had to be converted out 
of Imperial coin into a wide variety of other coin before export. 
This process was costly and time consuming.192 
189Jbid, part II, 694. 
190Jbid., part II, 388, 407, 507, 550. 
191Jbid., part II, 350, 351. 
192Jbid., part II, 407. 
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Vaughn's accountl93 for 1545 shows five borrowings. Of these 
three are bill transactions originated in England by the Lord 
Chancellor for payment in Antwerp. The first of these was for 
£5 ,500 Flemish for conduct money for German mercenaries secured 
from, rather than on the credit of, the Bonvici bank. The second was 
for £18,000 Fl. which netted to £16,896 12s Fl. after origination, 
delivery and interest charges. The third, also for unknown purposes 
was a small loan of £533 6s 8d Fl. made by Sir John Gresham. 
The other two loans were actually "taken up" in Antwerp. That 
1s they were borrowed on the bourse. They consisted of the Fugger 
loan of £100,000 Fl. and a loan of £6,000, actually taken up by 
Jasper Douche, for repayment in London. This loan was probably 
related to Douche's much troubled trade in wode and herring. This 
was a rather poor showing for a king whose credit "was established." 
During the year Vaughn remitted £31,827 to Thomas Gresham, 
who may then have been acting as a treasurer for War at Calais, 
directly paid £77 ,066 for military expenses, primarily the wages of 
German mercenaries, and sent £40,000 in jewels to England. In 
addition he paid £5,000 to Jasper Douche for his herring seized m 
England, and £800 in brokerage fees. Miscellaneous fees were paid 
for transporting coin. How much of the money paid to Gresham was 
spent in France and how much was remitted to England is uncertain 
but it is clear that most of the money was spent in France rather 
than forwarded to the mint. 
193Ibid, part II, 957. 
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Vaughn ended the year with the Fugger loan due in August and 
the need for additional funds to carry on the wars unabated. The 
change in the diplomatic situation did not immediately reduce the 
Imperial demand for credit as Charles continued borrowing heavily 
for his war against the German Protestant princes. In addition 
England was now facing France alone. While it was clearly in the 
Emperor's interest that England not be completely defeated by 
France, it was equally clearly in the Emperor's interest that England 
not be free to assist the Protestant princes. In addition the 
immanence of war in Germany disrupted trade, thereby reducing the 
value of the bonds of the Merchant Adventurers and the City of 
London. One positive effect of the change in the diplomatic situation 
was that Jasper Douche disappeared from English finance.194 
Despite this situation Vaughn was under enormous pressure to 
raise additional loans. He succeeded in borrowing £30,000 Flemish 
in fustians from the Fuggers in February for six months. Repayment 
was guaranteed by the city of London. The "loan" carried the 
provision that the fustians had to be sold in England for not less 
than the loan amount. This was accomplished19S but the short period 
194Douche continued to play an important role for the Hapsburgs down to 1550 
when his arbitrage activities between Lyons and Antwerp got him involved in loaning 
money to the king of France. The Procurator-General demanded the death penalty and 
the right to examine Ducci under torture, but, although Ducci was convicted of usury 
the treason charges were dropped. He fell from favor. Ehrenberg, Capital and 
Financh pp. 159-160. 
1951t is important to note that no coin was loaned in the Netherlands. The coin 
was instead raised in England. It would be interesting to know who the buyers were. 
I suspect that the sale of the Fustians was to London merchants and in part a forced 
contribution. 
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of the loan left both it and the prior Fugger loan of 300,000 crowns 
(£100,000 Flemish) due on August 15, 1546. 
To meet this need Vaughn attempted to negotiate other loans 
through the spring and early summer of 1546. He succeeded only in 
ra1smg £27, 125 FL on the letters of credit of the Italian merchant 
houses in London. These were in fact English domestic loans on 
which the proceeds were received in Antwerp rather than foreign 
borrowing. Faced with the immanence of default, the Council 
decided to repay £152,189 Fl. and to prolong the rest.196 
The repayment of even a portion of the crown's debts required 
great efforts. Again, as in 1545, sums were pulled together from 
the various treasuries. They totaled £94,000 sterling which should 
have been about £120,000 Fl. In addition £20,000 Fl. was borrowed 
from Erasmus Schetz who paid it directly to the Fugger. Finally, on 
August 15, 1546, the due date, the Fugger agreed to accept payment 
of £92,180 Fl and to put over the balance for six months at 6 112 % 
in return for the English buying in excess of 8,571 quintals of copper 
for £20,000 Fl., the whole to be secured by the bonds of the City of 
London.197 Slowly through the fall the lesser debts were retired. 
When Henry VIII died on January 7, 154 7 he left no overdue 
debts. The outstanding indebtedness consisted of £80,000 Fl. owed 
to the Fugger, and £20,000 Fl. owed to the Schetz. This was a 
modest enough debt after three years of war. However, England was 
not yet at peace and the resources of the kingdom were very 
196Letters and Papers, XXI, part I, 1042. 
197Jbid., part I, 1250, 1383 (98), 1537 (2). 
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strained. The year 1546 had seen a very marked change in the 
quality of English credit. The king, far from being able to borrow 
com on his own credit and that of the Privy Council and the City of 
London, had been reduced to borrowing goods at artificial rates and 
to accepting jewels in place of coin at a significant but unknown 
cost. The necessity of purchasing copper in order to renew the 
Fugger loan in August 1546 shows clearly that the English debt was 
not investment grade. 
Edward Vi's new government under the Protector Somerset in 
1547 was faced with the same need for funds as Henry's had been. 
Under these conditions there was little possibility of either 
increasing the debt, England's credit was too bad, or reducing it, 
England's finances were too weak. This led to a policy of prolonging 
repayment at the cost of repeated purchases of goods and jewels 
whose value was less than the nominal amount loaned. Loans were 
paid with other loans. This however is not the heart of the story for 
as we shall see a major function of the Antwerp debt became to 
supply silver to the mint. 
In September Stephen Vaughn, who had been attempting to 
return to England for some time, left Antwerp to take up an 
appointment as an under-treasurer of the mint. He held this position 
until his death in 1549. The replacement of the highly competent 
Stephen Vaughn by William Dansell in January 1547 coincided with a 
change in the relationship between the King's Agent and the king's 
government. Stephen Vaughn's correspondence with Paget and the 
Council was, in general, that of a trusted and respected agent with 
satisfied employers. The correspondence of Dansell with Sir 
1 ""' lVL 
William Paget, Sir Thomas Smith and the Council was a long series 
of exasperated complaints originating from London and querulous 
self justification originating from Antwerp. Dansell had assisted 
Vaughn in 1546. Now with Vaughn's departure to England he took 
over both as Governor of the Merchant Adventurers in Antwerp and as 
King's Agent. Thomas Gresham, who had been serving as a treasurer 
at Calais assisted Dansell in raising and transporting coin. 
Dansell's situation was demanding. He was operating in four 
major areas. He was borrowing and repaying floating or bourse loans 
for the crown. He was buying silver bullion for the mint. He was 
acting as a government purchasing agent especially for military 
equipment. He was acting as a government sales agent for lead, tin, 
and bell metal. In these efforts his position was weakened by the 
proclivity of the Lord Protector and the Council for going around him 
directly to lenders, sellers and buyers. It is hard to resist a feeling 
of sympathy for the much harassed Dansell. 
Dansell's correspondence with the Council begins with a letter 
to Paget, dated March 24, 1547 in which he announced the payment 
of the debt owed to Erasmus Schetz and A. Fugger and the 
transmittal of the cancelled bonds to the Privy Council. The next 
correspondence preserved came from 1549. In that two year period 
two loans were recorded in the Treasury of Receipt. The first was a 
loan from Anthony Fugger on 13, October, 1547 for 129,650 florins 
to be repaid on March 31, 1548. The second was a loan from Lazarus 
Tucher in April 1548 for 167 ,218 florins.198 
the loan due on May 15, 1549. 
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This loan is probably 
It would be surprising if these two loans represented the sum 
total of borrowing by the crown in Antwerp in those years but they 
may very well be the bulk of that borrowing. We have already seen 
that in the Vaughn period there was usually only one major loan 
outstanding at a time. The easy assumption that the loan was from a 
single banking house should be avoided. They may very well 
represent consortium loans with the nominal originator acting for a 
group of bankers. In any case the loan of 1547 would have 
essentially replaced the Fugger and Schetz loans paid in April. The 
loan of 1548 would then have replaced the 1547 loan. 
The extant correspondence resumed with a letter from Dansell 
to the Lord Protector, 20 April, 1549, which announced that he had 
acquired money sufficient to pay the debt due on May 20 at 13 % and 
that if his majesty required more he could borrow another £100,000 
at 14 3 without taking any goods. He added that the Emperor himself 
borrowed at 15, 16, and even 183. The Council's response, 25 April 
1549, noted that Lazarus Tuch er expected to be repaid in full on May 
15th or be informed in advance of the king's wish to renew the loan. 
The Council advised Dan sell to take up no more money at 13 % and to 
negotiate the renewal of the loan at 12 % ,199 Dans ell's response of 3 
May, outlined his negotiations with Tucher for renewal, which were 
not going well, and with Erasmus Schetz for the money to pay Tucher 
198p. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward and Mary", pp. 86-87. 
199Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 137, 139. 
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which were proceeding. These negotiations yielded a loan from 
Schetz to pay off the Tucher loan at an interest rate of 13 % . While 
that loan was being collected Tucher offered to loan the king 
100,000 Carolus guilders (50,000 ducats, or £ 16,667) at 13 % 
interest.200 
In what may be a separate matter, the Council, on 17 May, 
1549 expressed surprise that they had received no reply to their 
letter respecting a bargain for bullion with Lazarus Tucher. This 
letter crossed with a letter of Dansell's of May 17 which noted the 
completion of the purchase of bullion. Lazarus Tucher had absolutely 
refused to export bullion from the Emperor's dominions but Dansell 
and a friend had purchased his entire supply of silver and would sell 
it to the crown at 6s. the fine ounce.201 
We have obviously entered a discussion in full flow. Dans ell 
had in hand efforts to refinance the debt at 13 % , 1 3 lower than the 
rates of 1546, and without the purchase of any goods. Why the 
Council disapproved the rate is unclear. Van der Wee says that 
commercial interest rates reached 10 % in the l 540s202 but 
government interest rates had been consistently at least 2 % and 
often 4 % higher than commercial rates. Dan sell says the Emperor 
was borrowing at 15-18 % . The truth of this is hard to sort out. The 
Netherland's court occasionally paid as little as 9% on small 
200Jbid., 139, 142, 146. 
201Jbid., 147, 148. 
202van der Wee, Antwerp, vol. II, p. 362. 
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loans203 in the late 1540s but Ducci was borrowing large sums for 
them at 12 112 -13%204 A thorough, loan by loan survey of payment 
terms and nominal interest rates would be needed to determine what 
rates the Imperial government was really paying on loans 
comparable to the English loans. In any case Dansell was not 
achieving the best rate in the market. 
The matter of the silver bullion is equally interesting. As 
noted above the key source of income for Somerset's regime was the 
mint. In order for that source to be productive a steady supply of 
specie was necessary. That specie could be and was derived from 
three sources. The most obvious source was the minting of plate and 
jewels, especially church plate. The second domestic source was 
the reminting of com. The third source was the importation of 
specie, either as coin or as bullion. 
The bullion transaction of May 1549 is the first recorded but 
is unlikely to have been the first. In it Dansell was associated with 
Thomas Gresham, former treasurer at Calais and future King's Agent 
at Antwerp. They purchased bullion from Lazarus Tucher, clearly on 
government instruction205, but at least in form on their own account 
and then smuggled the bullion out of the Netherlands. They offered 
it for sale to the mint at 6s the troy ounce or £3 12s the pound, a 
203Jbid. 
204Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, 264ff., S.T. Bindoff, "Economic Change", 
New Cambridge Modern History, ed. G.R. Elton, vol II, p.64, suggests 123 as the 
market rate. 
205see especially , Turnbull, Calendar. Mary, 156. 
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good price as the mint price of silver varied between £3 8s and £3 
12s. At the £3 12s price the mint would coin £7 4s and make a 
profit for the government of £3 12s the pound.206 
This left only the problem of paying for the silver. On the 
surface it makes little sense to buy silver to mint, especially if one 
was paying 13 % per annum for the privilege. The answer to the 
profitability of the bullion import and minting business lay in the 
exchange rate. Between May 1542 and April 1549 the intrinsic 
silver content of English coins had fallen by 60% while the exchange 
rate had fallen only 20%.207 This resulted in a situation in which the 
fiat value of coin produced from a pound of silver had increased by 
150% while the exchange value of that coin in Antwerp had increased 
by 100%. 
The implications of this situation were staggering. The 
government could, by importing and minting silver, earn a major 
profit at fiat value and at exchange value. If a merchant in Antwerp 
were willing to export silver specie, whether coin or bullion, in 
contravention of the imperial ban on export, and sell it to the mint 
m England, he too would make a substantial profit. 
The situation was not the same for gold and therein lies a part 
of the solution to the apparent illogic of the situation. One needs to 
remember the standard imperial payment terms with which Stephen 
Vaughn had had to comply. The emperor paid in 2/3 gold and 1/3 
silver. The debasement of the gold coin had been much less than the 
206Gould, The Great Debasement p. 12. 
207Ibid., p 94. 
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debasement of silver coin. The imperial payment terms by placing 
gold in the dominant position reduced the impact of the debasement 
of silver. Between May 1542 and April 1549 the gold content of 
English coin had declined only 203 against fiat value. This was 
approximately equivalent to the decline in the exchange rate.208 
That is English coin was trading at about the melt value, or Flemish 
mint price, of the gold component. The silver component, because of 
its convertibility at fiat value, was trading far above its melt value. 
The profits from importing silver were equal to the full se1gnorage 
available on silver minted plus 1/3 of the exchange profit as long as 
the English were willing to export gold to make up balance of 
payments residuals. A glance at Table III will show that at 
precisely this period the mint was making a major effort to attract 
gold for reminting. The seignorage on gold was reduced from £5 8s 
in April 1546 to only £1 4s in April 1547 while the fineness of the 
gold coin was maintained. This foregone profit was worth it if it 
permitted the government to obtain gold to export in return for 
silver. If this analysis is correct, it is as elegant an example of 
bimetallic currency value manipulation as one is ever likely to see. 
Dansell was also attempting to sell tin, lead, and bell metal. 
In this he seems to have been somewhat confused and the Council's 
exasperation is easy to understand. On 29, May 1549 he notified Sir 
Thomas Smith that Lazarus Tucher had received letters from Bruno, 
his factor in Antwerp, that the Lord Protector and the Council would 
208This is a rather simple explanation. For a more sophisticated view see 
Gould, The Great Debasement pp.86-113. 
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"bargain with him for money to be had in Frankfort, and to repay the 
same in tin, lead, and bell metal here." He informs Smith that 
Tuch er is willing to loan the king £22,500 at 12 % . 209 
On 3 June the Council replied that they had not wished to 
borrow money but to buy money for tin, lead and bell metal. On June 
11th the Council instructed Dansell to drop the matter with Tuch er 
if he would not let the king have money except on interest and then 
demanded that he attempt to get Tucher to accept commodities in 
payment of his Tucher's debt due in September. If this were 
unacceptable, Dansell was to extend the loan for another year at the 
lowest interest rate possible.210 
Dansell's negotiations with Tucher proved fruitless. On 
September 11th 1549 the loan appears to have been replaced with a 
new loan from the Fuggers for 328,800 florins to be repaid August 
15, 1550.211 The sudden doubling in the basic indebtedness was 
undoubtedly the result of the French declaration of war and invasion 
of the Boulonnais, August 8, 1549. This disaster coupled with 
widespread insurrection in England led to Somerset's fall and 
replacement by Hertford, soon to be Northumberland, in October 
1549.212 
209Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 155. 
210Jbid, 161, 164. 
211Jbid, 199, 207. 
212wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 177-178. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE FLANDERS DEBT 
1550-1557 
Northumberland's rise to power began a period of retrenchment 
in the government's finances. In April 1550 the Council ordered 
Dansell to prolong the debt due May 15, 1550 for another year. He 
was to accept the condition of purchasing 2400 kintalls of 
gunpowder at 50s the kintall for renewal.213 A further loan was 
taken from Erasmus Schetz on 5 May 1550 of 107,520 florins to be 
repaid May 15, 1551.214 With both the Schetz and the Fugger debt 
coming due in May 1551 the government's obligations in the 
Netherlands stood at at least 500,000 florins (£167,000 Fl.) with no 
visible means of repayment. 
On March 23, 1551 a major refunding of the debt was achieved 
through the Fugger. It provided for the Fugger to pay the Schetz 
£42,090 Fl. on May 15, 1551. That amounted to approximately 
125,000 florins for an effective interest rate on the Schetz loan of 
nearly 173 .21s The king was to repay the Fugger in one year with 8 % 
interest on the amount paid to the Schetz. The sum of £38,976 Fl. 
213APC,n. s. II, 426; Journal Edward VI, 18. 
214Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 87 cites State Papers 
Domestic, IV, no 5. 
215Given that the loan of May 1550 was the only outstanding debt to Schetz. 
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owing to the Fugger was extended for one year at 12 % interest. In 
return for the Fugger's assistance the king purchased jewels worth 
£33,333 6s 8d Fl. to be paid for in Antwerp in 11 months without 
interest; 12,000 marks weight of silver for just over £30,000 Fl. to 
be paid in August; and £14,000 Fl. of fustians to be sold in England, 
payable in Antwerp in April 1552 without interest.216 This was the 
last loan of Daunsell's period as king's agent. He was discharged 
April 15, 1551. 
It is clear that the Fugger loan of March supplied the mint with 
much of the specie for the final debased issues of silver coin. Two 
mints, Southwark and Tower I issued coin between April 1st and 
July 31st 1551. Together they produced coin to the face value of 
nearly £173,000.217 This would have required approximately 12,000 
lbs of fine silver.218 The Fugger loan, given an 8oz. Troy mark would 
have supplied 2/3 of the total. 
The crown debt in Antwerp stood at at least £158,000 
Flemish, £58,000 higher than in January 1547 .219 The government's 
situation was critical. The mint could no longer be a source of 
significant revenue as it had resumed minting high standard coin m 
216F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", pp. 86-87; this loan is 
typical of Fugger activity in the early 1550s. There appears to have been a change 
from loaning goods as a means of making a profit to loaning goods as a means of 
gaining coin. In April 1551 the Fuggers had made a substantial loan to the Emperor by 
issuing bonds on their firm which Charles V discounted through Wolf Haller von 
Hallerstein. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance. pp. 105-106. 
217challis, "The Debasement", pp. 460, 465. 
218Gould, The Great Debasement p. 11. 
219This is almost assuredly too little. 
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September 1551.220 The political situation precluded any maJor 
effort toward taxation. To make matters worse the exchange rate 
had gone into collapse at the end of 1550. Between June 1550 and 
July 1551 the £ sterling fell from 19s 5 l/2d Fl. to 12s 9d Fl., a fall 
of over a third in 14 months.221 That is the debt had increased by 
approximately 50% in sterling terms. The ability to profitably 
service debt by borrowing specie in Antwerp for the mint was gone. 
To a major extent this was self inflicted damage.222 The 
rumors of a calling down of the coin created a flight out of English 
com. The calling down began in effect with the revaluation of 
French gold, August 1550, which put the merchant community on 
notice that in English eyes, English gold was overvalued.223 By the 
time actual devaluation of the teston to 9d was announced on April 
30 1551 the foreign exchange market had already responded by 
dropping over 203. That the announced devaluation was not to take 
effect until August 31 created a situation in which English silver 
coin could only be acceptable at near post devaluation rates. This 
led to an additional fall which was enhanced by continuing rumors of 
a further call down. The government responded by advancing the 
date of the call down to 8 July and ordering punishment for rumors 
220APC , n.s., III, 400, IV, 57, 102; For the proclamations revaluing the base 
coin and related matters see Hughs and Larkin Vol I, 364, 367, 372, 373, 375, 376, 
379, 381, 382. 
221Gould, The Great Debasement p. 89. 
222see Turnbull , Calendar. Mary I, for Thomas Gresham's thoughts on the 
effect of a calling down of the coin. 
223Hughs and Larkin, Vol I, 364. 
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of further debasement. This was followed, on 17 August by a further 
devaluation of the teston from 9d to 6d.224 With the calling down of 
the base currency bimetallic arbitrage was no longer profitable. 
The new situation required a new approach to the debt. For a 
period in 1551 there was no chief financial agent. Sir Philip Hoby, 
Master of the Ordinance, and Sir Richard Morysine, and probably 
others acted in limited capacities in Flanders. Dansell was finally 
replaced by Thomas Gresham, his associate in the matter of the 
bullion. Gresham moved his family to Antwerp in December 1551 or 
January 1552. He lodged there with Jasper Schetz, who had taken 
Jasper Douche's vacated position as the Brussels court's primary 
financial agent at about that time.225 This intimate relationship 
with the largest borrowing agent on the bourse and a major creditor 
of the English crown may go far to explain Gresham's success both 
as an advisor to the Privy Council and as a financier. 
Gresham's early activities in Antwerp focused on debt 
refinancing. When the first payment came due on the Fugger bonds in 
February 1552 Sir Philip Hoby took £53,500 Fl. out of England to 
Antwerp. To complete the payment Gresham borrowed, at a rate of 
73 for six months, £10,000 FL from Lazarus Tucher. Of this £4,000 
went to complete the sum for a debt payment due April 30, 1552226, 
2241bid, 372, 373, 376, 379. 
225J. W. Burgon, Gresham, p 70; Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 250. 
226 As it appears that the amount due in February was only £33,333 Fl. the 
need for £57,300 is puzzling. Perhaps a portion of the £91,000 Fl. due in March and 
April was paid in advance or perhaps there were other loans of which no record 
survives. The king's J ournaL 66, records payments of £63,000 Flemish to the 
Fuggers in February and £14,000 in April. 
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£1,000 was paid to Schetz, and the residue placed in safe custody. 
At the end of April an additional £14,000 Flemish was paid to the 
Fuggers.227 In May 1552 Jasper Schetz was paid £6, 180 out of 
money raised from the king's debts.228 
There remained bonds due in May for £45,500 Fl. and in August 
for £56,600. At the instruction of Council, Gresham put over the 
August bonds possibly on the terms offered to the Fuggers of 
payment of £5,000 with the remainder to be carried over for one 
year. He also negotiated an agreement with the Fuggers on the 
August loans but it was rejected by the Council. Gresham seems to 
have exceeded his authority. He had been authorized to put over the 
bonds on the original terms without accepting any goods, but had 
only been able to negotiate a renewal on the normal condition of the 
king taking goods "in fee penny" in addition to the renewal.229 
Gresham had negotiated to convert the £56,000 due in August 
into a new loan of £52,000 at 12% for one year and the purchase of 
two jewels for £9,000. Separately he had negotiated with the 
Fugger an agreement to put over £25 ,000 for a year in return for 
taking £5,000 in fustians. Both of these agreements were refused 
by the Council. Gresham warned the Council of the great damage to 
the king's honor and profit to be expected from default and offered 
227J. W. Burgon, Gresham, p. 80-81, cites Add Mss. No. 5498, fol 36 h; 
JournaL 33, 60, 62, 63, 65; APC, n.s. IV, 27; This was presumably for the fustians. 
228 APC, IV, 58. 
229J. W. Burgon, Gresham, vol. I, pp.88-92. 
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his resignation. This was followed by a promise that if his advice 
were followed "I do not mistrust but in two years to bring his 
majesty wholely out of debt. "230 
Gresham's advice was to improve the exchange rate by creating 
an artificial shortage of pounds sterling in Antwerp, and to 
establish a royal monopoly on lead with its staple at Antwerp. The 
lead staple idea, however feasible, was not acted on. The exchange 
operation was actually begun in September but soon suspended. 
Gresham's idea was to buy up sterling in small quantity on a daily 
basis. By taking up £1200 a week a shortage would be created and 
the pound would slowly rise, facilitating repayment of the debt and 
reducing the cost of imports.231 While this plan might have worked 
over a period of months, the government was on the verge of 
suspending payments and probably had more pressing uses for its 
limited funds. 
Of far more immediate importance was the decision of the 
Council to employ more fully both the funds and credit of the 
Staplers and Adventurers. We have seen that as early as 1545 
Stephen Vaughn and the Council had considered using the proceeds of 
the Merchant Adventurer's sales in Antwerp to service the debt. It 
had proved infeasible at that time. Now, in the summer of 1552 
with the government actually out of money, and about to suspend 
payments this plan was revived. Between July 1552 and July 1553 
the City of London, and the merchants of England, especially the 
2301bid. 
231Jbid., pp. 94-95. 
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Adventurers and the Staplers, were to assume responsibility for 
funding the debt. 
This was accomplished in three steps. First, the Mayor and 
aldermen of the City of London guaranteed loan renewals in April and 
September, presumably to cover the May and August bonds.232 There 
was nothing new about this. Second, in July, the Merchants of the 
Staple loaned the government the amount of the expected customs 
revenues from their next shipping with "some good portion of money 
besides". In October the Merchant Adventurers agreed to lend the 
king £40,000 repayable in March 1553. Third, in November 1552 the 
Staplers agreed to take over a loan of £21,000 due to the Fuggers in 
February, agreeing to pay £10,000 before February 15 and the rest on 
prorogation, on which they would be responsible for the interest. In 
the Spring of 1553 the Staplers and the Adventurers jointly assumed 
responsibility for another £43,771 in debts due to the Fugger, the 
Schetz, the Rellingers and van HaJl.233 
The crown was only borrowing this money but the debt had 
become domesticated. The claims of Northumberland's government 
to having reduced the foreign debt rest on this very thin foundation. 
Nearly £70,000 Fl. of debt had been transfered from Antwerp to 
London. It would still have to repaid but the repayment would be m 
part political and economic rather than in part diplomatic. The 
repayment included the removal of the Hanse privileges in England, 
and the strengthening of the Adventurer's monopoly against English 
232APC, IV, 29, 129. 
233p. C. Dietz 197, APC IV, 169, 267; Journal Edward VI. 80. 
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interlopers. This policy of effective monopoly of the cloth trade 
was critical to Gresham's and the Council's major effort on behalf of 
the exchange.234 
Next, the Privy Council, following Gresham's advice, used a 
different set of measures to improve the exchange and service the 
debt. As we have noted the Adventurers sent their cloth to Antwerp 
in fleets twice a year for the Pask and Cold Marts. Council had the 
fleet for the Cold Mart of October 1552 held until the Adventurers 
agreed to tender all the bills of exchange from the mart to Gresham 
in Antwerp for future repayment in London. In October 1552 
Gresham reported that the Antwerp-London exchange rate stood at 
16s. Fl. to the pound sterling. Gresham took in some £60,000 Fl. in 
bills of exchange for redemption in London. By reimbursing the 
merchants at l 9s Fl. to the pound sterling the government not only 
made a short term profit but forced up the exchange. This maneuver 
was repeated in April/May 1553 for the Pask Mart. On that occasion 
some £61,000 Fl. at an Antwerp exchange rate of 19s Fl. to the pound 
sterling were taken in for repayment in London at 23s 4d Fl. per 
pound sterling. In both cases the government paid the notes in 6 
months rather than the six weeks normal in commercial transactions 
at the Antwerp marts.235 Thus, the payment of one set of bills 
234Gresham himself seems to have been particularly concerned with 
interlopers. See his comments to Northumberland on the injurious effect of 
"retailers" on trade, Turnbull, Calendar, 655. 
235Tawney and Powers, Tudor Economic Documents, II, 146-149; APC IV 
183, 199, 204, 267-268. 
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matched the receipt of the next. A permanent loan of £60,000 at no 
interest had been transfered to the government. 
This compulsory exchange mechanism was, in effect, a tax on 
exports which yielded approximately 18 3/4 3 ad valoram in the fall 
of 1552 and approximately 27 3/43 ad valoram in the spring of 
1553. It was also a long term loan at no interest. This was worth 
another 14 3 per annum on £60,000 to the crown. The exchange rate 
effects were more problematic. It is possible but not certain that 
the exchange would have improved in any case with the minting of 
new coin at higher specie content. If the entire exchange rate effect 
were due to Gresham's and Council's manipulations then the net 
effect would have been that the management of bills of exchange for 
the benefit of the crown reduced the value of the crowns debt in 
sterling terms by approximately 443 between October 1552 and May 
1553. 
The immediate effect must have been to reduce the volume of 
imports into England 
Adventurer's liquidity. 
dramatically by sharply reducing the 
This would have reversed the trade deficit 
and created a positive balance of payments between England and 
Flanders. The secondary effect of the improvement in the exchange 
may have been to bring an end to the cloth boom of the late 1540s. 
The merchants were not pleased. Even Gresham's uncle, Sir 
John, was displeased and complied only upon seeing 
Northumberland's warrant.236 Yet, in the end, the Adventurers 
benefited through their enhanced monopoly. This policy of 
236J. W. Burgon, Gresham, vol. I, pp. 464-465. 
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supporting the exchange continued intermittently down to the 1570s 
as a major, and much overlooked, element in Tudor fiscal policy. 
The success of the restoration of the exchange can perhaps 
best be measured in the relatively small foreign debt inherited by 
Queen Mary. As we have seen the minimum foreign debt in April 
1551 was £158,000 Fl.. Of this £44,000 Fl. was transfered to the 
Adventurers and Staplers in the spring of 1553. When Mary ascended 
the throne the debt had shrunk to £ 61,000 FI..237 Therefore 
approximately £ 50,000 Fl. had been repaid in the spring of 1553. 
Professor Dietz states "This reduction was made by allowing the 
payments of various government departments to fall very much 
further in arrears. "238 While it is true that the government's 
domestic payments were badly in arrears, the logic of the situation 
argues that the Privy Council used its Flemish bills of exchange to 
pay down the debt. 
The management of the foreign debt in the reign of queen Mary 
was, in most important respects, a continuation of the policies 
begun under Northumberland. There were however differences. As 
early as October 1553 the government decided to reverse the policy 
of Northumberland's last year and increase the debt. There were 
pressing reasons for this, not least the political decision to cancel 
the remaining payments of Northumberland's subsidy and the 
political importance of bringing domestic accounts current. With 
237F. C.Dietz, "Finances of Edward and Mary", p. 112, cites State Papers 
Domestic Mary I, No. 14. 
238F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 112. 
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parliamentary taxes politically infeasible for the moment, there 
was really no other option. A second significant difference between 
Mary's debt management and Northumberland's was that Mary 
restored the privileges of the Hanse.239 This imposed an 
unnecessary strain on relations between the Merchant Adventurers 
and the crown, and therefore between the City of London and the 
Crown. The third, and most important difference was Queen Mary's 
marnage Philip von Hapsburg. This unavoidably affected English 
credit at a time when the credit of the Hapsburg lands was 
collapsing. 
In brief, the Hapsburg's financial situation had been 
deteriorating from the 1520s onward. The high cost of continual 
wars with France and the Turks and intermittent wars with the 
German princes had over strained the resources of the emperor. Only 
the unprecedented inflow of silver from the new world which began 
m the 1540s permitted the Hapsburgs to carry on. The great crisis 
m Imperial finance began in 1551 with the agreement between 
Elector Maurice of Saxony and the French crown in which the French, 
in return for Metz, Toul and Verdun, funded Maurice's war against the 
Emperor. 
Maurice's spectacular advance into the Tyrol and the Emperor's 
flight to Villach exposed the full bankruptcy of the Hapsburgs. The 
emperor, having failed to borrow money in the Netherlands, south 
Germany and Italy, was unable to raise troops. He was only saved 
from capitulation by a personal loan from Anton Fugger. Continuing 
2390. M. Loades, Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 195-196; Cal Sp., XI, 315. 
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war m Germany and renewed war with France in 1555 brought the 
Hapsburgs to the brink of disaster. The French king raised enormous 
loans on Lyons, the famous "Le Grand Parti". The Hapsburg's could 
barely prolong their notes and had to give security for all new 
borrowings. By mid 1555 new loans were costing the Hapsburgs 
243. All revenues were thought to be pledged through 1557. The 
interest on the floating debt of the Netherlands government rose 
from £ 285,982 in 1554 to £1,357 ,287 in 1556. In the Spring of 
1557 the Spanish crown declared a moratorium on payments both in 
Spain and in the Netherlands. The Spanish public debt was converted 
into perpetual bonds at 5 3 interest.240 Given that the proper rate of 
interest on the Spanish debt, after refinancing was approximately 
143 this represented a capital loss of over 2/3 on any sale of 
Spanish bonds. 
The troubles of the Hapsburgs put a very significant strain on 
the Antwerp markets. Coin was in short supply through the 1550s 
because the south German bankers were overextended to the 
Hapsburgs and because continuing war in Germany disrupted their 
business. 
The English decision in the fall of 1553 to reenter the market 
as net borrowers was at least ill timed. Hapsburg borrowing was 
squeezing everyone else out. To further complicate matters Thomas 
Gresham was not reappointed as Agent for three months. In 
November 1553 he was dispatched to Antwerp to borrow £50,000 at 
240van der Wee, Antwerp, Vol II., pp. 214-215; Ehrenberg, Capital and 
Finance. pp. 275-280, pp. 334-335. 
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not more than 123241. In the interim one Christopher Dawntesey had 
been authorized by the Privy Council to take up 200,000 florins 
(£33,000). He borrowed from Lazarus Tucher at an effective rate of 
143.242 When Gresham again took control he found the loan to be 
unbreakable and the 143 rate established.243 
In December, 1553 Gresham was instructed by the Queen to 
raise £100,000 at not more than 123. This proved to be impossible. 
He was instead offered two loans of 40-50,000 Carolus gildem at 
153. Arte van Dale and Pruen offered 16,000 at 63 for six months. 
However his commission did not permit him to take up money for 
less than a year and by the time he had received permission the 
money was no longer available. The Fugger and the Schetz initially 
pronounced themselves unable to loan because of their large 
commitments to the Emperor.244 
Finally, on December 24th Gresham was able to inform the 
Council that he had succeeded in borrowing 120,000 Carolus guildern 
(£20,000) from the Schetz, the Ligsalz and the Fleckhammer at 13 3 
for one year. He asked whether it was enough and requested 
permission to return to England to settle his account.245 The Council 
24Iw. B. Turnbull, ed., Calendar of State Papers. Foreign Series. of the Reign 
of Mary 1553-1558 , (Her Majesty's Stationery Office: London, 1861; reprint 
Krause: Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967), 73. 
242Turnbull, Calendar. Mary , 69, 77. 
243ibid., 83, 87, 104. 
244ibid., 104. 
245ibid., 111. 
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responded on December 28th that when he had taken up another 
60,000 florins the Queen would allow him to return home for a 
time.246 In January 1554 Gresham succeeded in making an 
agreement with the Diodotti of Lucca for 50,000 florins.at 12 % 
This loan was delayed for a month by the political uncertainties 
caused by Wyatt's rebellion but was available in February.247 
The tightness of money in Antwerp was repeatedly noted by 
Gresham. The Emperors demands for money were draining the Schetz 
and the Fugger. Tucher was forced to request new bonds from the 
Queen and Privy Council because he had been obliged to loan the 
Emperor 200,000 florins and so to keep his promise to the Queen had 
had to borrow 54,720 florins from others houses. These houses wish 
to have their own bonds as security The sums available on the 
bourse were now so small that Gresham requested blank bonds in the 
amount of £10,000 each to facilitate his taking up coin.248 
Given the shortage of coin on the Antwerp market it is not 
surprising that Gresham, when approached by certain Genoese in 
January 1554, was interested in taking up a large amount of silver 
on bills of exchange in Spain. The Genoese were not the only ones 
interested in getting money owed them out of Spain. The Hapsburg 
credit demands coupled with export restrictions from Spain had left 
a large number of important bankers with funds trapped in Spain. 
The approaching marriage of Philip and Mary offered them an 
246ibid., 112. 
247ibid., 130, 146, 156. 
248ibid., 104, 123, 135, 210. 
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opportunity to convert their bills of exchange on the fair at Villalon 
into coin at Antwerp. By May 26, 1554 Anthony Fugger and nephews, 
Gaspar Schetz and brothers, and four Italian houses had all agreed to 
deliver their bills of exchange to Gresham.249 
The Spanish venture turned out to be a complete fiasco. 
Gresham had agreed with the foreign houses and had been instructed 
by the Queen to take up 300,750 ducats (£100,000), most of it in 
June but some of it as late as October. Passports had been obtained, 
not without difficulty, from the Emperor for 200,000 ducats to be 
exported from Spain. Gresham departed for Spain about the middle 
of June 1554 leaving John Gresham and Nicholas Holborne to act in 
Antwerp in his absence. It was not until August that passports were 
made available for an additional 120,000 ducats to be exported. It 
was not until November 30th that the first shipment of 100,000 
ducats was ready for shipment from Seville. The rest had not 
arrived. The coin shortage in Spain was intense because the plate 
fleet was late. Gresham was being blamed for the failure of a bank 
m Valladolid.250 
Eventually all 300,750 ducats were shipped but it is unlikely 
that they were available at the mint before December 1554. As 
repayment was due on 235,000 ducats with interest in May and June 
the Queen had not had much use of her money. Efforts were made, by 
249ibid., 135, 201. I; The amounts of the bills provided by each are in the 
Queens instructions to Gresham are printed in Tawney and Powers, Tudor Economic 
Documents, Vol II, p. 144. 
250W. B. Turnbull, Calendar, Mary. 297. 
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John Gresham and Holborne to prolong the debt. They were to little 
avail. The Tucher loan due in October was extended with half of the 
amount due three months and half in six months but the bonds for 
the bills on Spain were not.251 
In Thomas Gresham's absence the crown's agents had remained 
active on the Antwerp bourse. John Gresham and Nicholas Holbome 
had borrowed £71,000 Fl. of which £20,000 came from the English 
merchants. They had expended almost £100,000 sterling on paying 
loans. Of this £35,000 had been forwarded by Sir Edward Peckam 
from the mint. These activities left the debt in Flanders reduced by 
about £55,000 and the debt in England increased by nearly 
£20,000.252 
Thomas Gresham, upon his return to Antwerp in March 1555, 
undertook a major program of debt reduction which was to culminate 
in the elimination of the Antwerp debt in 1557. The loans 
outstanding in March 1555 were substantial. The inherited debt had 
been £61,000. The Dauntsey borrowing from Tucher had increased 
the debt by £33,000. Greshams loans from the Shetz, Ligsalz and 
Fleckhammer, and the Diodotti had increased the debt by £28,000. 
The Spanish loan had added another £100,250. Thus the balance 
forward plus total major borrowings for the period to March 1555 
totaled no less than £222,000. Of this some £55,000 had been paid 
by John Gresham and Nicholas Holbome. This left a balance of 
approximately £167,000 owing. 
251,w. B. Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 332. 
2521.oades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 291-292. 
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Between March 1555 and January 1556 the debt was brought 
down to £109,103. How this was accomplished is unclear in detail 
but clear in outline. Thomas Gresham again employed the credit and 
the receipts of the Merchant Adventurers and Staplers to 
domesticate the debt. Professor Loades misunderstands the history 
of the transactions between Gresham, on behalf of the crown, and 
the Adventurers and Staplers. Loades says: 
"At that point (January 1556), there seems to have been a 
change of policy. Hitherto the staplers and merchant 
adventurers had been used mainly to supply short-term 
or 'bridging' loans to cover payments to the Antwerp 
bankers that the latter had been unwilling or unable to 
extend. In later years Gresham was to develop a 
technique for minimizing the effects of a capricious 
exchange by using the adventurers and staplers to deliver 
money in Antwerp at artificially fixed rates. The Crown 
then repaid them in London As we have already seen , a 
transaction of a similar kind had taken place in the first 
year of the reign, and it is likely that Gresham had, in 
fact, developed this 'device' several years before 1558, 
when it was first specifically mentioned.253 
Professor Loades is quite correct that the loan of £18,000 
made by the adventurers, at an artificial exchange rate, was in the 
nature of a bridging loan.254 It was not, however, a pure bridging 
loan as the moneys were loaned in Flemish pounds and repaid in 
pounds sterling at a profit to the crown. Professor Loades is vague 
on the date of the "device". As we have seen it was first applied in 
October 1552. It was applied again in May of 1553. It does not 
253Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 292-293. 
254w. B. Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 354. 
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appear to have been applied in October 1553, May 1554, October 
1554 or May 1555. It does however look suspiciously as though it 
were back in force in October 1555 in modified form. In that month 
Gresham gathered £25,000 from the Adventurers and £13,000 from 
the Staplers on the payments of the Cold Mart. These sums are 
considerably less than the approximately £60,000 Fl. in bills of 
exchange taken at the marts of 1552 and 1553 but enough to meet 
the queen's need for £38,000 to repay outstanding notes in October. 
If the May loan of £18,000 and the October loan of £38,000 are 
deducted from the £167,000 outstanding in March 1555 the 
calculated debt would have been £111,000 in January 1556. If both 
of these loans from the merchants were at the artificial rate 
governing the loan of May (21s Fl./£ st.) the actual debt outstanding 
would have been almost precisely £109,000 Fl. 
No actual debt had been eliminated but, once again, a 
considerable portion of the foreign debt had been domesticated. The 
political price paid for this was paid in advance with the exclusion 
of the Hanse from trading between London and the Netherlands in 
March, 1555.255 It would go on being paid through the gradual 
reduction of the status of the Hanse and through increasing 
diplomatic difficulties in the Baltic, but these problems were worth 
it. 
In the Spring of 1556 a further £100,000, presumably sterling, 
were borrowed from the Adventurers and Staplers to liquidate the 
255Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers, p. 128. 
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Flanders debt.256 These loans probably carried interest at 8 1/23 251 
rather than 143 and could be extended indefinitely through taking 
new loans. In May 1557 the last Antwerp indebtedness was 
discharged. 
AFIERWARD 
The renewal of war with France in 1557 led to a final round of 
borrowing. By Mary's death some £90,000 was owing in Antwerp.258 
These sums continued to grow as long as the war lasted. The peace 
of Cateau Cambresis, March 1559, ended the Hapsburg Valois 
struggle. The Antwerp debt stood at nearly £280,000 in April 1560. 
Thereafter it was reduced and domesticated in the standard manner 
under the same men who had dealt with it from the time of Edward 
VI. In 1571 usury was legalized in England and the Royal exchange 
was founded by Thomas Gresham to perform the same functions as 
the Antwerp Bourse. Thereafter the debt was to remain 
domesticated for the remainder of the Tudor era.259 
256cal Ven VI, 338, cited in Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 293. 
257This was the interest rate paid on the May and October borrowings., 
Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 293. 
2581...oades , The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 420. 
259n. M. Palliser, The Age of Elizabeth: England under the later Tudors 1547-
lQQ.3,_ (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 294-295. 
CHAPTER YIU 
CONCLUSION 
The finances of the English government in the sixteenth 
century were buffeted by inflation and war. The enormous pnce 
increases reduced the value of traditional sources of revenue while 
increasing expenses. One of the areas where expense increases were 
greatest was war. Between 1511 and 1514 Henry Vlll's first war 
with France exhausted the reserves left him by Henry Vil. Between 
1522 and 1525 Henry repeated and completed the process. The 
failure of the Amicable Grant of 1525 demonstrated the inadequacy 
of Henry's fiscal system to support major foreign war. 
Politically, the period from 1528 to 1542 was dominated by 
Henry's marital and religious controversies. Fiscally the period was 
dominated by Henry's need to restore the reserves necessary to wage 
major war either defensive against a feared combination of 
Hapsburg and Valois monarchs under papal sponsorship or offensive 
against Scotland and France. The very large sums gained by the 
appropriation of the Church's wealth and through attainder allowed 
Henry to resume his wars in 1542. 
The attack on France in 1544 in concert with the Emperor was 
a marginal military success, a diplomatic disaster and a fiscal 
catastrophe. 
lost, and 
Boulogne was won, the alliance with the Empire was 
English expenses of £650,000 exceeded planned 
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expenditures by £400,000. The success of Cromwell's and Henry's 
fiscal efforts of the period 1534-1542 were amply demonstrated by 
England's ability to carry on alone against both France and Scotland 
and attain, if not victory, at least a draw. The cycle of wars begun 
by Henry in 1542 ended in 1550 with England exhausted. During that 
period the crown had had to rely on a number of expedients, chiefly 
land sales, debasement of coinage and foreign borrowing to 
supplement its very inadequate normal and tax revenues. 
The Antwerp debt which originated in 1544 as a modest 
planned borrowing in anticipation of revenues became an ongomg 
feature of crown finances. In the original Henrician phase of 1544-
1547 it was a source of funds to directly meet the needs of war. 
Money was borrowed in Flanders primarily for the purchase of 
munitions and the pay of soldiers engaged in operations against 
France. The money borrowed in Antwerp was either transfered to 
the treasurers for war in Calais or paid out in Antwerp upon 
instruction from the Privy Council. 
Repayment was a continuing problem. The first set of loans 
were repaid out of domestic revenue. By 1546 loan extensions were 
necessary. These required the purchase of goods as fee penny. 
Little, if any, new money was being raised. 
The situation appears to have changed dramatically in the 
crown's favor by 1549 through the exploitation of the differential 
between the metallic content of the pound sterling and the pound 
Flemish and their exchange rates. The small reduction in the value 
of the pound sterling relative to its metal content allowed the 
importation and reminting of silver from the Netherlands at 
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astounding profits to the crown and very substantial profits to those 
tendering silver at the mint. This process made Flanders an 
important source of revenue to the Protector's government. The 
calling down of the coin under Northumberland put an end to this 
source of profit and restored the Flanders debt to its role as a 
burden on government requiring reduction. 
The reduction of the Flanders debt was accomplished by 
domestication. The City of London, the Staplers, and the Merchant 
Adventurers were brought to assume the debt. The methods of 
transfering the debt tended to increase the Merchant Adventurer's 
importance as the main source of bills of exchange. They achieved a 
strengthening of their monopoly of the cloth trade while the crown 
realized substantial profits which allowed some of the debt to be 
retired. 
The increase in the debt in the first years of Mary's reign was 
ill judged. Except for Gresham's unfortunate venture in Spain little 
money was raised, and, without further debasement, what money 
was raised could not be turned to profit. The Flanders debt was 
costing 133. By borrowings from the Merchant Adventurers and 
Staplers the debt was retired between March 1555 and May 1557. 
C. F. Dietz has argued that "In the final analysis governmental 
revenue systems are efforts to turn the chief forms of wealth of the 
country most efficiently to the support of the state, with due regard 
for the prevailing political idea or theory. Their nature varies with 
1 3 1 
and corresponds, sometimes tardily, to the changing economic 
development and organization of the country. "260 
As we have noted a key aspect of the price revolution was the 
nse m wealth of the commercial sector relative to the agricultural 
sector. The traditional revenue system continued to rely on the 
agrarian rents and stereotyped taxes which did not reflect this 
change. In managing the debt, however, the Privy Council, Thomas 
Gresham, the Duke of Northumberland and Queen Mary found means to 
tum the wealth of the merchants to the support of the state. 
In doing so they relieved the crown of its foreign obligations 
and set the pattern for the final elimination of the foreign debt 
under Elizabeth. This was a major achievement. Coupled with the 
new Marian Book of Rates it restored balance to the fiscal system 
and allowed England to meet the crises of the last twenty years of 
Elizabeth's reign. 
260 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 71. 
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Phelps Brown - Hopkins 
Price Index 
Year Index Year Index 
lSOO 94 1S30 169 
l SO 1 107 1S31 1S4 
1S02 122 1S32 179 
1S03 114 1S33 169 
1S04 107 1S34 14S 
lSOS 103 1S3S 1 31 
1S06 106 1S36 164 
1S07 98 1S37 lSS 
1S08 100 1S38 138 
1S09 92 1S39 147 
Average 104.3 Average l S s .1 
Change in Decade Change in Decade 4.80% 
Cumulative Change Cumulative Change 48. 71 % 
ls l 0 103 1S40 1S8 
1S11 97 1S41 16S 
1S12 101 1S42 172 
1S13 120 1S43 I 7 1 
1S14 1 1 8 1S44 178 
lSlS 107 1S4S 1 91 
1S16 1 1 0 1S46 248 
1Sl7 1 1 1 1S47 231 
1S18 116 1S48 193 
1Sl9 129 1S49 214 
Average 111. 2 Average 192. l 
Change in Decade 6.62% Change in Decade 23.86% 
Cumulative Change 6.62% Cumulative Change 84.18% 
1S20 137 lSSO 262 
1S21 167 lSSl 28S 
1S22 160 1SS2 276 
1S23 136 1SS3 2S9 
1S24 133 1SS4 276 
1S2S 129 lSSS 270 
1S26 133 1SS6 370 
1S27 147 1SS7 409 
1S28 179 1SS8 230 
1S29 1S9 1SS9 2SS 
Average 148.0 Average 289.2 
Change in Decade 33.09 % Change in Decade SO.SS% 
Cumulative Change 41.90% Cumulative Change 177.283 
Decade 
1510-19 
1520-29 
1530-39 
1540-49 
1550-59 
Decade 
1530-39 
1540-49 
1550-59 
1500-03 
1503-05 
1506-08 
1509-11 
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1524-26 
1527-1529 
15 30-32 
Analysis of Land Rents 
After Kerridge 
Phelps Brown Herbert Manors Seymour Manors 
Index Rents on New Rents on New 
1510-19=100 Takings Takings 
100 100 100 
133 95 134 
140 202 144 
173 210 153 
229 308 159 
Phelps Brown Herbert Manors Seymour Manors 
Index Implicit Implicit 
1510-19=100 Average Rent Average Rent 
140 123 128 
173 177 144 
229 232 152 
London Shortclothes Exported 
Annual Averages 
49,214 1533-35 
43,884 1536-38 
50,373 1539-41 
58,447 1542-44 
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66,159 1550 
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72,910 1552 
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66,049 1559-61 
140 
Crown Manors 
Rents on New 
Takings 
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116 
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142 
Crown Manors 
Implicit 
Average Rent 
104 
112 
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87 ,231 
102,660 
99 ,362 
118,642 
132, 767 
112,710 
84,968 
93,812 
